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I. INTRODUCTION
I hope the reader will indulge me in my use of the terms "white, " "black," "mulatto,"
and "Negro. " Admittedly, they are very loose and laden with powerful emotional charges.
But most who read this book will know their weaknesses and recognize their strengths as
necessary symbols in talking about these subjects.
-Joel Williamson'
A. Green, Black, and White
Robert Green filed suit to have the New Orleans Bureau of Vital Statistics
2change the race on the birth certificate of Jacqueline Ann Henley. Green
wanted to adopt the child who was four years old; however he could not be-
cause he was Black and the child was listed as white on her birth certificate.3 A
curator ad hoc was appointed by the court to represent the child's interests.
Based on the curator ad hoc's answer to Green's allegation that the child was
Black, the court dismissed Green's suit, and Green then appealed.
The child, Jacqueline Ann Henley, was born on November 2, 1950. Her
mother Ruby Henley Preuc was a divorced white woman. Shortly after Jac-
queline was born, Ruby turned her over to the child's aunt, Mrs. Harold
McBride, to care for her. Two years later, Ruby died of cancer without ever
having revealed the identity of the Jacqueline's father. On August 1, 1952, a
couple of months before Ruby Preuc's death, Mrs. McBride asked the Depart-
ment of Welfare to take Jacqueline because "she could no longer permit the
child to remain in her home, since the neighbors were beginning to comment
about the medium brown color of the child's skin."4 At that time, proceedings
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1. JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE xii (1984).
2. See Green v. City of New Orleans, 88 So. 2d 76, 77 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
3. See id.
4. Id
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began to declare Jacqueline abandoned, and she was soon placed in a Black
foster home.
Green, Jacqueline's foster parent, sought to adopt her. His application was
approved by the Department of Welfare until an examination of her birth cer-
tificate revealed that she was registered as white. When the Bureau of Vital
Statistics refused to reclassify her racial status, Green was not allowed to adopt
Jacqueline. At that time, Green filed suit to prove that Jacqueline Ann Henley
was indeed Black, and that her birth certificate should be changed to reflect
that fact. Green would then be eligible to adopt her.
Green's case was based on the testimony of several witnesses. Ruby Hen-
ley Preuc had been a barmaid at a "Negro saloon," and the plaintiff sought to
use this fact to prove her child was likely fathered by a Black man. 5 One of his
witnesses was a Black man named Herbert Stanton who did not testify that he
was the father or that he had had a sexual relationship with the child's mother.
Instead, he testified that he wrote to Ruby while she was in Detroit, and he
showed the court a letter to her containing such phrases as "but you know I'll
always love you" and "I wish you was home I miss you so."6 The court of ap-
peals characterized the testimony of Stanton as an example of the trial judge
"most liberally relaxing the rules of evidence" so as to give the plaintiff every
7opportunity to prove his case.
Green also offered the testimony of Mrs. Emma Smith, the woman who
was responsible for filling out the birth certificate. She stated that she had not
inquired about the race of Jacqueline's father. She further testified that, when-
ever the mother is white, she does not ask if the father is white. Instead, she
"take[s] it for granted he is white."8 Mrs. McBride, the child's aunt, then testi-
fied about her sister leaving the child with her, and her decision to turn the
child over to the Department of Welfare. She stated that she told a Mrs. Ober-
holtzer at the Department of Welfare that the child "didn't fit in [her] family,
she was too dark," and that people had made comment that "the child was pos-
sibly a nigger." 9 However, Mrs. McBride had no knowledge pertaining to the
actual race of the child's father or whether Ruby Preuc had ever had a relation-
ship with a Black man outside of her work. Both Mrs. Oberholtzer from the
Department of Welfare and a lawyer named Charles Collins testified that Mrs.
McBride had spoken to each of them about her concerns that the child was
Black and that Mrs. McBride, who lived in an all white neighborhood, would
not be able to keep the child in her home. 10





10. See id. at 79.
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The witness that the court found most compelling was the only expert wit-
ness, Dr. Arden R. King. Dr. King was a Tulane University professor of an-
thropology. 11 Dr. King testified that he had examined Jacqueline Ann Henley
and that she was probably part Black. He based his conclusion on "three char-
acteristics which are distinctly Negro in this child."' 12 Those three characteris-
tics were "lip seam," "distinctly small, delicate ears," and "concentrations of
pigments in diagnostic positions of the anatomy."' 13 He testified that while
those characteristics could appear in someone who is not Black, the chances
would be very low. While he stated on cross-examination that he could not
positively say that the child was Black, he would be in a better position to do
so when she reached the age of nine or ten.14 The dissent, however, pointed out
that Dr. King was certain that the child's father was not white.'
5
The court did not give much weight to any of the testimony other than that
of Dr. King since the other witnesses had no actual knowledge of the father's
race. The court was also somewhat skeptical of Dr. King's testimony and
stated that "all the methods presently in use to determine race are precarious
and... their provisional findings must be accepted with the utmost caution."'
' 6
While the general rule for civil cases is that the plaintiff does not have to
prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt, this court interpreted precedent to
require that in cases where a person seeks to change the race listed on a record,
he must prove his case such that there is no doubt that the race should be
changed.' 7 The majority found that Green had not proven his case adequately
since even his best witness could not yet be certain that the child's father was
Black.
Instead of dismissing the suit, however, they chose to nonsuit Green so that
he could file suit at a later time when Dr. King would be able to testify as to the
race of the child's father with more certainty.' 8 Judge Janvier in his dissent,
however, believed that the court should go ahead and order the change of the
child's race on the birth certificate immediately, since Dr. King was certain





15. See id. at 82 (Janvier, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 80.
17. See id. at 80; see also State ex. rel Treadaway v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 61 So. 2d 735,
739 (La. 1952) ("The registration of a birthright must be given as much sanctity in the law as the regis-
tration of a property right."); Sunseri v. Cassagne, 185 So. 1, 5 (La. 1938) ("[Defendant's] marriage
should not be annulled on the ground that she is of the negro race unless all the evidence adduced leaves
no room for doubt that such is the case."); State ex. rel Treadaway v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 56
So. 2d 249, 250 (La. Ct. App. 1952) ("[T]here must be no doubt at all ....
18. See Green, 88 So. 2d at 81.
19. See id. at 82 (Janvier, J., dissenting).
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of substantial evidence, there was no doubt that the child was Black and should
be adopted by a Black family.
Trials of racial determination in the United States reach back at least to the
nineteenth century and forward to the latter part of the twentieth. 20 Although
contexts and the tests used by courts have varied over time,2 1 a bedrock crite-
rion has remained the visible or phenotypic appearance of the individual whose
race was in question. The reliance on appearance as a legal criterion to deter-
mine racial status reflects a sufficient although not always necessary incident to
the social practice of racial sorting. Determinations of racial status occur rou-
tinely as part of everyday interactions. Especially in the context of first-time
encounters, Americans are wont to surmise the racial identity of those persons
with whom they come into contact. The criteria for making racial judgments
are social and automatic. They are hardly ever subject to scrutiny in the imme-
diacy of racial recognition and are rarely revised. For the most part, racial rec-
ognition is a visual phenomenon. I see you and, by the very act of seeing, know
that you are Black, white, or Asian. What cannot be discerned from mere
sight-parentage, ancestry, self-identification, language, education, class, na-
tional origin, cultural affiliation, and so forth-is subordinate to the racial
judgment. These other factors come into play, if at all, when the visual appre-
hension of race yields uncertainty or doubt. To articulate the criteria of racial
classification, one cannot rely only on doubtful cases. One must begin with
22plain cases in order to explain doubtful cases, and not vice versa.
This Article will examine the visually overdetermined 23 racial situation of
Black Americans in law and society and examine where such overdetermina-
20. See generally IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(1996); see also Raymond T. Diamond & Robert J. Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana's Racial Clas-
sification Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 LOYOLA L. REv. 255 (1983); Ariela J. Gross,
Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth Century South, 108 YALE L.J.
109 (1998); Chris Ballentine, Note, "Who is a Negro?" Revisited: Determining Individual Racial Status
for Purposes of Affirmative Action, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 683 (1983).
21. Tests for racial status have included "blood" or ancestral relation, color or appearance, commu-
nity knowledge, expert knowledge, national origin, and self-identification. For the "blood" relation test,
see, for example, Diamond & Cottrol, supra note 20, at 257, who relate the codification of the Louisiana
law that restricted white racial status to those having one-thirty-second or less of "Negro blood." For
color or appearance, also described as the "eyeball" test, see Gross, supra note 20, at 137 (citing Garvin
v. State, 52 Miss. 207, 209 (1876), for the proposition that a "colored person" may be "brought to [the
jurors'] attention of proof by ocular demonstration"). For community and expert knowledge tests, which
tended to combine with notions of racial status as based on national origin, see HANEY LOPEZ, supra
note 20, at 63-64 (noting that federal appellate courts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries mainly
used "science" and "common knowledge" to decide whether immigrants should be considered white
persons). For an administrative regime that appears to be based solely on self-identification, see Ballen-
tine, supra note 20, at 689 (reporting that Department of Commerce guidelines permit an individual to
choose his own racial status).
22. In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), for example, the Court appears to be absolutely
certain about who is "a negro" and who is "white." It appears that visual appearance, common knowl-
edge, and social status as a slave were sufficient to lead the court to conclude that Dred Scott was "a
negro."
23. On my use of the term "visually overdetermined," see infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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tion exceeds credulity in the case of individuals who "pass" for white. It has
been suggested that whiteness may be viewed as property, 24 and thus "passing"
for white is treated as a kind of group identity trespass. But judicial determina-
tions of race indicate that if whiteness is to be viewed as property, it is a very
special kind of property, which is on the one hand heritable, transparent, and
exclusive, yet on the other hand defeasible and socially ambiguous. As in the
example of Green v. City of New Orleans, whiteness can only be properly
transferred intergenerationally when both parents are also white. But even as-
suming that both of Jacqueline's parents were white, due to the absence of her
father, her claim to whiteness is treated as both transparent and exclusive-it is
taken for granted that the father is white 25 and this presumption can be defeated
only by a standard that exceeds the criminal burden of proof. Yet her whiteness
is subject to the analytic gaze of science and the racially suspicious surveil-
lance of the community. Jacqueline, at some indefinite point in her progress
toward maturity, may turn out to be Black.
There are several points to be made about this schema of racial determina-
tion that will be developed in the course of this Article. First, in the absence of
artifice, no one who is visually apprehended as Black in a relatively anony-
mous context (what I will call "first-time encounters")-where parentage, an-
cestry, self-identification, national origin, and so forth, are unknown-turns out
to be white.26 By virtue of this intransitivity, the color line is endowed with
remarkable stability and ideological persuasiveness. The judgment of Black-
ness is fixed, immediate, irrevocable; the judgment of whiteness is ever subject
to modification, revision, error. Second, the focus on first-time encounters is
justified by the fact that casual contexts in which a body sees another body
provide the experiential staging ground for both racial determination and racial
discrimination. There is no Rawlsian veil of ignorance that shields us from one
another's racial gazes. Third, in order to reveal the ideological character of ra-
cial identities implicated in the American schema of racial determination, it
will be necessary to examine constitutively and phenomenologically what is
meant by Black and white in the discourse of race. As will be shown, "passing"
is the key concept that unlocks the door to racial identity. Put another way,
there is no racial identity without "passing," since "passing" marks a boundary
between us and them, Black and white, one and the other. Finally, in order to
challenge the ideology of race, it will neither do to complain, along with anti-
essentialist critics, that the line of division is arbitrary, nor is it sufficient to
add, along with the multiracialist movement, new categories of racial division.
24. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Propery, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707 (1993); see
also State ex. rel Treadaway v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 61 So. 2d 735, 739 (1952) (comparing the
birth right of white racial status to property rights).
25. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
26. This is a social observation, but it may be legally accurate as well.
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As Kimberld Crenshaw has said, engaging in self-conscious ideological strug-
gle requires transcendence of "the oppositional dynamic in which Blacks are
cast simply and solely as whites' subordinate 'other."'
27
The decision to retell the story of Jacqueline Green's trial of racial deter-
mination as a method of introduction to the subject of "passing" driven by the
way in which its narrative provides a context, both familiar and strange, for
consideration of the points to be made about the American schema of racial
determination. Although it could be said that Green failed to "pass"-because
of her "medium brown color" she was placed with a Black family--Green was
nevertheless presumed to be white by the court and officially so designated by
the state. The presumption of the court, however, was not shared by the com-
munity in which Green lived. Thus, Green exemplifies the split between law
and society created by the contradiction of a white legal subject who cannot
"pass" for white. Legal discourse and popular discourse on "passing," it will be
shown, are committed to this contradiction for a similar set of reasons.
Moreover, that Green's racial future should be made to depend on physical
characteristics such as lip seam, small ears, and pigment concentrations, high-
lights the reification of the look in racial discourse. Thus, Green is a good ex-
ample of whiteness being subject to investigation and modification based on a
visual paradigm of race that nevertheless invokes the notion of racial blood.
The legal presumption of Green's whiteness unravels in the context of first-
time encounters in which she is seen as Black. The legal presumption of white-
ness forces Green to "pass" as that for which she would never be taken, as a
subject capable of demarcating the white side of the race line. It also reveals
that "passing" defines what would be the successful occupation of that subject
position.
Just as importantly, Green surfaces the value that is placed on whiteness by
detailing the extent to which individuals operating within the system of racial
discrimination were willing to go to protect whiteness from Black encroach-
ment in particular. Jacqueline Green was abandoned by her blood relative be-
cause she "possibly was a nigger.'' 28 Yet, based on the fact that she was only
four years old, it can perhaps be safely assumed that the concern over her race
was an issue only for the adults. As a child, Jacqueline Green's lack of identity
investment in the racial order points to another split that will be useful to ex-
plore: the split between identity and subjectivity in the construction of racial-
ized bodies. Analysis of this split and of the social valuation that continues to
be afforded to whiteness will shed light on at least part of what is at stake in
current attacks on race-conscious discourse, such as colorblindness and multi-
racialism.
27. Kimberl Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legiti-
mation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1385 (1988).
28. Green v. City of New Orleans, 88 So. 2d 76, 78 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
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B. Outline of the Argument
My critical strategy returns us to the historical development and milieu of
"passing" in order to uncover the discursive foundations of that authority in the
juridical investment of the racial condition of the individual. It will be argued
that a dividend of this investment is the "black homunculus," a metaphor of the
metaphor of the Blackness within, which is key to an elaboration of authentic
whiteness--"purity"-and the stylization of the person of partial African de-
scent as impure---"having Black blood." Part II begins with the definition of
the legal status of the "passing" person in the antebellum South and then turns
to its postbellum constitutionalization and a critique of its enforcement in the
contemporary period. This backdrop centers on a rereading of cases from the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which judicial scrutiny of race reinforces
not only white discourse agreements 29 about the racial condition of the individ-
ual, but also marks the person of partial African ancestry as racial trespasser on
whiteness. These cases, taken together, link past to present by supporting a
consistent and characteristic evasion of the discourse agreements of white
authority-evasion of the sociopolitical meaning of the claim to whiteness.
Part III considers how the uses of "passing" in popular consciousness recircu-
late the judgments of legal discourse about the racial condition of the "passing"
person. Part IV offers some critical evaluations of two seemingly opposed
doctrinal responses to our racial social system, the turn to colorblindness and
multiracialism. Finally, Part V concludes this examination in light of the pre-
cautions against white supremacist racial ideology with which we began. Be-
fore embarking on this Article's analysis, however, a note on the origins of this
Article and its methodological approach to the subject of "passing" is in order.
C. A Note on Origins
Perhaps it is somewhat anomalous near the end of the twentieth century to
revisit an issue such as racial 'passing.' 30 Why, after all, would a legal-
29. For explanation of the term "discourse agreement," see infra note 68.
30. Carol-Anne Tyler states, "Ours is the era of the passing of passing as a politically viable re-
sponse to oppression." Carole-Anne Tyler, Passing: Narcissism, Identity, and Difference, 6
DIFFERENCES 212, 212 (1994). The former reference to passing signifies a connection to death, while
the latter refers to racial "passing." In this Article, racial "passing" appears in quotation marks in order
to highlight its contested meaning in racial discourse. Tyler's contention appears to be born out by the
proliferation of writers phenotypically qualified to "pass" who nevertheless claim a Black identity. For
examples of such authors, see generally SHIRLEE TAYLOR HAIZLIP, THE SWEETER THE JUICE (1994);
JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WIuTE BLACK WOMAN: RACE, COLOR, AND COMMUNITY (1995);
GREGORY HOWARD WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE: THE TRUE STORY OF A WHITE BOY WHO
DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1996); Adrian Piper, Passing for White, Passing for Black, 58 Transition
4 (1993); Judy Scales-Trent, Commonalities: On Being Black and White, Different, and the Same, 2
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305 (1990). The topicality of the "passing" narrative is evidenced in both the
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 18:297, 2000
historical account of "passing" constitute more than the racial arcana of a by-
gone era? To such skepticism, I offer at the outset two brief responses, one
based on a personal relationship and the other on an intellectual commitment.
The arguments of this Article were born out of many intense conversations
over a long period of time with Professor Paul Rogers. 31 Like myself, Professor
Rogers is a Black male academic who has discovered that a rigorous and nu-
anced appreciation of race matters is important to our scholarly work and pro-
fessional development. Thus, many of the texts cited here are texts that we
have shared critically. As an art historian, the focus of his analyses has been
the representation of race in the visual image. 32 As a philosopher and legal
academic, my focus has been on the discursive practices surrounding race in
the law.33 Our mutual experience has been that, in applying our insights on race
to the issue of "passing," we have felt the exhilaration of both reclaiming a
subjectivity too often denied in racial discourse and re-articulating an element
of an uncompromising antisubordination perspective. 34 That element, which is
recurrently honored in the breach even among our most astute and critical
commentators, is the obligation to demystify racial categories.35 The typical
way in which "passing" is discussed serves as the focal point of this lapse into
mystification. It thus provides a particularly dense, albeit panic-stricken, ex-
pression of racial categorization that is ripe for intervention on both the visual-
analytical and the juridical-discursive levels. 36
scholarly and popular attention which is now being paid to it. See Harris, supra note 24, at 1712-13 (ar-
guing that "passing is not an obsolete phenomenon that has slipped into history" because of the white
supremacist economic logic that continues to motivate it). Most recently, in October 1996, there was a
graduate student conference held at Columbia University devoted to the topic of "passing." Neverthe-
less, it is not altogether clear that the concept of "passing" is being refunctioned beyond the ambitions of
the bi-racial/multi-racial movement. See MAUREEN T. REDDY, CROSSING THE COLOR LINE 65-103
(1994); Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of ldentity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orien-
tation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 263. 267-75 (1995).
31. Whatever enlightenment this article may bring, I share with my friend and soulmate. Any fail-
ings should be attributed to the author alone.
32. For one example of Professor Rogers's work, see Paul Rogers, Hard Core Poverty, in
PICTuRING Us: AFRICAN AMERICAN IDENTITY IN PHOTOGRAPHY 158 (Deborah Willis ed., 1995).
33. See, e.g., Robert Westley, White Normativity and the Racial Rhetoric of Equal Protection, in
EXISTENCE IN BLACK: AN ANTHOLOGY OF BLACK ExISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY 91 (Lewis R. Gordon ed.,
1997).
34. I do not use the term "subjectivity" casually, nor as a synonym for "identity," which it is not.
For one attempt to tease out the relation between "identity" and "subject," see Jennifer Wicke, Postmod-
ern Identity and the Legal Subject, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 455, 463 (1991). Provisionally, it should be
stated that my use of the term subjectivity will function in most instances as a synonym for subject posi-
tion. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy As Scholarship As Struggle, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 2231, 2252-70 (1992) (discussing three separate though interrelated meanings of the
term subjectivity as indicating 1) positioned perspective, 2) nonneutrality of purpose, and 3) occupying
the linguistic position of subject rather than object). For more on the relation between subject and iden-
tity, see infra Parts I.D & III.
35. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 326-27 (1987).
36. See generally Karst, supra note 30 (providing an example of such a juridical-discursive inter-
vention based on the metaphors of both "passing" and "outing").
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It is my intellectual commitment to strengthen and support the antisubordi-
nation project of the Critical Race Theory movement. 37 Critical Race Theory
has been described as embracing "a movement of left scholars, most of them
scholars of color, situated in law schools, whose work challenges the ways in
which race and racial power are constructed and represented in American legal
culture and, more generally, in American society as a whole." 38 Some of the
main methodological directions Critical Race Theory scholars have taken in-
clude the analysis of the role of race/gender essentialism in legal theory,3 9 the
use of narrative and autobiography in minority critiques of the law, 40 the need
4 1for an intersectional approach to race and gender issues, and multiple con-
sciousness.42
A crucial aspect of the antisubordination project of Critical Race Theory
involves the demystification of categories and discursive practices within the
law.43 For it is through various acts of mystification-conflation of catego-
ries, 44 reification of identity, 45 bifurcation of social existence, 46 and the impo-
37. Many thanks to those both in and out of the movement who read earlier versions of this article.
I especially wish to acknowledge Celina Romany and Rachel Moran for their comments at the 1995 An-
nual Hispanic Bar Association Conference, Francisco Valdez, Angela Harris, Robert Chang, Adrienne
Davis, Ray Diamond, Wendy Brown-Scott, and my research assistants, Charles Hamilton, Heather Au-
yung and Dita Kavyas for their supererogatory efforts.
38. CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii (Kimberld
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
39. See generally, e.g., Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations
on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994) (analyzing the role of race);
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (ana-
lyzing the role of race and gender).
40. See generally Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others. A Plea for Narra-
tive, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989) (discussing the use of narrative and autobography in minority writ-
ings); James R. Hachney, Jr., Derrick Bell's Re-Sounding: W.E.B. Du Bois, Modernism, and Critical
Race Scholarship, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 141 (1998) (same) (reviewing PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (8th ed. 1995); Sandra S. Polin, Book
Review, 22 N.C. CENT. L.J. 83 (1996) (same).
41. See generally, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Poli-
tics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN L. REV. 1241 (1991) (using an intersectional ap-
proach to analyze violence against women).
42. See generally, e.g., Ma Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Ju-
risprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989) (discussing multiple consciousness).
43. For examples of Critical Race Theory texts that demystify categories, see generally Neil Go-
tanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Harris, supra note
24; Lawrence, supra note 35; Haney L6pez, supra note 39; Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating
Yonnonidio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L. J. 625; Francisco
Valdez, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and
"Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1995).
44. See Valdez, supra note 43,passim.
45. See Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Stories and Standing: The Legal Meaning of Identity, re-
printed in AFTER IDENTITY: A READER IN LAW AND CULTURE 129 (Dan Danielson & Karen Engle eds.,
1995) (discussing the reification of identity).
46. On racial bifurcation, see generally Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Schol-
arship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1265
(1993); Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome, " in ASIAN AMERICANS
AND THE SUPREME COURT 1087 (Hyung-Chan Kim ed., 1992); Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Consti-
tution: Beyond the Black and White Binary Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 571 (1995). On
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sition of semantic structures that misrecognize (however subtly) the experi-
ences they purport to render meaningful or meaningless 47-that certain forms
of subordination become not only possible, but invisible. As Torres and Milun
observe,
The problem with conflicting systems of meaning is that there is a history and so-
cial practice reflected and contained within the language chosen. To require a par-
ticular way of telling a story not only strips away nuances of meaning but also ele-
vates a particular version of events to a non-contingent status.
48
In this Article, I want to argue that the continuing ability of the Black fig-
ure to elicit lure and loathing,49 to be ever serviceable to a process of totemiza-
tion-or, as Professor Rogers would have it, "Samboification"-suggests the
need to construct novel readings of the operations of racial categories in order
to demystify the discursive terms under which social justice claims will be
fashioned. The impetus toward novel readings takes on a sense of urgency in
the glare of the untimely disintegration of the civil rights consensus on the left,
the ominous consolidation of judicial and political power on the right, and the
apocalyptic pessimism of a postmodem takeover within the American acad-
emy.
°
D. A Note on Methodological Approach to the Subject of "Passing"
This Article seeks to accomplish an intervention on the racial ideology that
equates partial African ancestry with Blackness, and a recharacterization of
what is at stake in identity politics for the visibly Black subject. This will re-
quire us to observe a meaningful distinction between the terms "identity" and
"subjectivity." As the French structuralist philosopher Louis Althusser demon-
strates in his celebrated essay, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,51
race/sex bifurcation, see generally Kimberld Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. Cin. LEGAL F. 139; Crenshaw, supra note 41.
47. See generally Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School. An Essay on
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993) (utilizing the somewhat infelicitous expression "voice
of color" to launch a doggedly misguided semantic attack on the "difference" line of thought contained
in some Critical Race Theory writing); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in MARXISM AND LAW
210 (Piers Beirne & Richard Quinney eds., 1982) (distinguishing between the "perpetrator perspective"
and "victim perspective" on racial discrimination); Lawrence, supra note 35, (positing the thesis of "un-
conscious racial motivation" as an explanation for some of the legal positions taken on remedies).
48. Torres & Milun, supra note 43, at 629.
49. On loathing, see Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epi-
thets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 139 (1982) citing the correlation between
degree of darkness of skin for Blacks and the level of discrimination induced stress. See also Leonard
M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a Longer Discrimina-
tory Shadow Than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENVER U. L.
REV. 131, 133 (1997) (noting that darker-skinned persons of color experience greater discrimination
than their lighter-skinned counterparts).
50. See Wicke, supra note 34, at 469-72.
51. See Louis ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND
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the ordinary use of the term "subject" carries two divergent significations.52
On the one hand, subject means "a free subjectivity," a centre of initiatives,
author of and responsible for its actions. On the other hand, subject means "a
subjected being" who submits to higher authority and is therefore stripped of
all freedom except that of freely accepting his submission. In Althusserian
terms, moreover, the individual is interpellated as a subject.53 Interpellation as
a subject occurs quite simply when an individual is "hailed," for instance,
when a police officer (or other) hails: "Hey, you there!" For Althusser, when
the individual recognizes that it is she who is being hailed, then the individual
becomes a subject. Responding to the hail makes the individual a subject in
both senses of the term. As a center of initiatives, she chooses to turn around;
choosing to turn around, she submits to the authority of the hailing.
This seemingly mundane articulation of subject formation acquires its
weight in relation to a consideration of its ideological functioning, and for pre-
sent purposes, a consideration of its functioning within the corporeal schema of
racial ideology. This Article argues that under the corporeal schema of racial
ideology the Black subject is interpellated differently than the subject capable
of "passing" for white. Further, this Article argues that this difference is not
necessarily hinged on how the individual personally identifies. Identity, in
contrast to subjectivity, is an expression, based in processes of affinity and af-
filiation, of how the individual personally identifies himself or herself, as a
man or woman, as gay or heterosexual, as Black or white, and so on.54 Recog-
nizing this distinction between subject and identity becomes a way of taking
seriously the Critical Race Theory arguments against essentialism and in favor
of a social constructionist view of identity categories, while at the same time
acknowledging the importance of subject position to one's experience of racial
discrimination.
"Passing" has been defined as crossing the race line and winning accep-
tance as white in the white world.55 In this view, racial "passing" is a distinctly
post-bellum concern that reached its peak in the early part of the twentieth
century.56 The difficulty that might be raised with this view of "passing" as a
sociopolitical phenomenon is that it remains firmly entrenched inside white su-
premacist racial discourse.57 This is so because "passing" is assumed to be the
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971).
52. See id. at 170-71.
53. See id. at 173-74.
54. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 42-48 (1990).
55. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 119-20. In this regard, Williamson's grammar reflects the
dominant view of "passing." See also 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 683-88 (1944) (discussing passing as moving from Black to
white and not vice versa).
56. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 119-20.
57. See ALDON LYNN NIELSEN, READING RACE: WHITE AMERICAN POETS AND THE RACIAL
DISCOURSE IN THE TWENTETH CENTURY 14-15 (1988) (citing George M. Fredrickson's six elements of
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crossing of a coherently demarcated "race line," and by implication, crossing
illegitimately.5 In this view, to "pass" for white is a kind of trespass on an-
other's identity. It is also a betrayal of the "Blackness within." 59 There are
those who perpetrate whiteness-the "passers"-and then those who are
"really" white, "pure" white.60 Conversely, there is no trespass on Black iden-
tity, and no betrayal of the "whiteness within" implied by "passing," since
there is no suggestion that anyone would "cross the race line" to win accep-
tance as Black in the Black world.6' In any event, "acceptance as white" is
meant to distinguish something other than simply "being white" in a manner
that makes "winning acceptance as white" a teleology worthy of description.
Alternatively, "passing" could be described as the social process whereby
the phenotypically qualified accept a racial identity in order to function within
a system of racially justified privileges and exclusions. To be phenotypically
racist ideology emerging from nineteenth century discursive practices in GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON,
THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY,
1817-1914, at 321 (1971)).
58. Fredrickson lists as his fourth element of racist ideology the belief that
Because of these permanent or deep seated differences, miscegenation, especially in the form
of intermarriage, is to be discouraged (to put it as mildly as possible), because the crossing of
such diverse types leads either to a short-lived and unprolific breed or to a type that even if
permanent is inferior to the whites in those innate qualities giving Caucasian civilization its
progressive and creative characteristics.
FREDERICKSON, supra note 57, at 321 (emphasis added).
59. See Williamson, supra note 1, at 182 (describing the "mulattoes of lighter hue" who chose the
white side, giving up "the thought of their blackness"). Throughout his text, Williamson employs the
trope of the blackness when discussing persons of partial African ancestry, at one point making the par-
ticipation of the "mulatto elite" in the Harlem Renaissance "one of the most critical turns that Afro-
American history has taken" since it "signified the essential [one might as well say essentialist] accep-
tance by the Negro world of the one-drop rule," id. at 152, and at another point bemoaning the fate of
"mulattoes who could pass for white" because they suffer "extreme discrimination within the Negro
world, one that borders on a rejection of the one-drop rule," id. at 190. Williamson, however, never
questions the coherency of the rule, or, for that matter, who made it up.
60. See id. at 108 (describing the phenomenon of the "biologically purely white" who becomes
"behaviorally black").
61. In this Article, the term "passing" refers specifically to a subjective possibility for those who
are visually indistinguishable from the in-group but would be rejected by that group based on a real or
imagined ancestral relation to an out-group. If this definition were limited to an actual ancestral relation,
it would not be broad enough to encompass instances of so-called "soulmaning," nonblacks who cos-
metically alter their appearance in order to "pass" as black. For the term "soulmaning," see Luther
Wright, Jr., Who's Black Who's White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the United States's Defini-
tion of Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REv. 513, 559 (1995). Author John Howard Grif-
fin "soulmaned" in his celebrated ethnojoumalistic experiment, BLACK LIKE ME (1966). Although Grif-
fin hoped to utilize his racial imposture as a tool for antiracist social critique, Gayle Wald argues
persuasively that Griffin fails by positioning the white researcher as a privileged voice to authenticate
racism while reifying Blackness and romanticizing "real" Black people. See Gayle Wald, "A Most Dis-
agreeable Mirror": Reflections on White Identity in Black Like Me, in PASSING AND THE FICTIONS OF
IDENTITY 151 (Elaine K. Ginsburg, ed., 1996) (suggesting that the book owes its enduring popularity to
the persistence of white incredulity at Black peoples' interpretations of their experience). To the extent
that such impostures involve artifice, seek recognition as illusory, and are readily abandoned, it is un-
certain whether blackface minstrelsy, see generally ERIC LOTT, LOVE AND THEFT: BLACKFACE
MINSTRELSRY AND THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1993) (discussing minstrelsry), or "souimaning,"
however motivated, should be conceptualized as identity-based "passing." For further elaboration on the
thematics of "passing," see infra notes 136-154 and accompanying text.
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qualified, ancestry will matter, but only insofar as that ancestry is ascertainable
in the individual by social perception and customary usage. Under this de-
scription, the white supremacist tautology that a white person is white because
she is white-or has "white blood"-is no longer permitted. A white person is
white because she is socially perceived to be white according to customary us-
age. She is phenotypically qualified to adopt a white racial identity; and the
visual idiom, in which racial ideology finds both its genesis and vitality, con-
firms her acceptance of her whiteness. She is white because she "passes" for
white. Our definition allows us to now state clearly that everyone who is white
"passes" for white, where whiteness signifies phenotypically qualified access
to a racial spoils system.
This re-reading of "passing" is a point of entry for discussion of certain
lapses in critical literature and visual texts that purport to analyze, examine,
and represent the phenomenon.62 My understanding of race critical discourse is
that matters have proceeded this far: First, "race" must be a sociohistorical,
cultural concept. 63 This is so despite the historical attempt of race theorists to
naturalize "race" by making it an idee fixe in scientific discourse, a difference
rooted in biology, blood, and genes.64 Second, as a social construct, the concept
of "race" has had a pernicious career, making racism endemic to American
life.65 Thus, racism must serve as a primary hermeneutic in the study and
analysis of corrupt political, economic, and legal institutions. 66 Third, racism
terminates neither in petty personal discriminations (micro-aggressions) 67 nor
in a range of systemic social and institutional limitations placed on the ex-
cluded. Rather, it extends to the discursive practices which coerce these ar-
rangements over time through a set of "discourse agreements. 68
62. For an historical treatment of "passing," see generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 1. For law, see
generally Harris, supra note 24 at 1709. For literary treatment, see generally JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES
THAT MATTER 171 (1993) ("Clare passes not only because she is light-skinned, but because she refuses
to introduce her blackness into conversation, and so withholds the conversational marker which would
counter the hegemonic presumption that she is white."); Lauren Berlant, National Brands/National
Body: Imitation of Life, in COMPARATIVE AMERICAN IDENTITIES: RACE, SEX, AND NATIONALITY IN
THE MODERN TEXT 110 (Hortense J. Spillers ed., 1991); Claudia Tate, Nella Larsen's Passing: A Prob-
lem of Interpretation, 14 BLACK AM. LITERATURE F. 142 (1980); Cheryl A. Wall, Passing for What?
Aspects ofIdentity in Nella Larsen's Novels, 20 BLACK AM. LITERATURE F. 97 (1986). For a philo-
sophical treatment, see generally BERNARD R. BOXILL, BLACKS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 12 (1984) ("[T]he
black who can pass as white... cannot choose not to be black ... ").
63. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM
THE 1960S TO THE 1990s, at 60 (1994).
64. See id. at 63-64.
65. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 2-3 (2d ed. 1980).
66. See id; see also MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6-7 (1993).
67. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559-77 (1989); see also Thomas
F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L.
REv./CIv. RTS. DEVS. 673, 687 (1985) (listing as one of the six elements of the new racism: "indirect
'micro-aggressions' against [Bllacks which is expressed in avoidance of face-to-face interaction with
[B]lacks and opposition to racial change for ostensibly nonracial reasons").
68. See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 242 (1980) ("When we communicate, it is
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Here it is posed that language functions dialogically as both the terminus
and the generator of racist thought. What is left for dead in racial terms revivi-
fies at the level of everyday (normative) thought and survives as frozen meta-
phors. Interlaced into this fabric of expressive relations is the pattern of white
authority. 69 "Passing," as the crossing of the race line, is one such frozen or
dead metaphor, one that obeys the logic of white supremacist discourse agree-
ments. "Passing" relies on the tautology of white racial identity, the myth of
racial purity, and the fiction of the Blackness within as it evokes the image of
the "tragic mulatto., 70 Examining "passing" narratives as dead metaphors
opens a conceptual path to demystification of these white myths. Investigating
"passing" in its historical development starkly reveals the elements of white
discourse that survive today in the rhetoric of both colorblindness and multira-
cialism.
II. LEGAL-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON "PASSING" AND RACE
The following legal-historical examples serve as a point of departure for
discussion of the complicity of the law in the construction of "passing" as a ra-
cial transgression. As will be shown, there is always already an antecedent
Blackness, whether figurative or real, that is assumed in order to sustain the ra-
cially transgressive view of "passing." I argue that that antecedent Blackness,
even though absent from adjudication and unacknowledged by courts, never-
theless is made to support and validate white supremacist discursive practices. I
conclude that despite alternative tests of racial recognition adopted by courts,
the discernment of Black subjectivity, unlike whiteness, is dependent on the
visual apprehension of race.
To show the presence of antecedent Blackness in legal discourse, I begin
the analysis with a case from the text of slavery in the nineteenth century and
the development of the Harper doctrine. This analysis will show the impera-
tives that stood behind the treatment of whiteness as insufficiently captured by
the eyeball test of racial determination and white supremacy's need for a con-
cept of racial blood. However, it will be argued, the imperatives that stood be-
because we are parties to a set of discourse agreements which are in effect decisions as to what can be
stipulated as fact. It is these decisions and the agreement to abide by them, rather than the availability of
substance, that make it possible for us to refer ....1"); ALDON LYNN NIELSEN, READING RACE: THE
WHITE AMERICAN POET AND THE RACIAL DISCOURSE IN THE TwENTIETH CENTURY 12 (1985). Applied
to the present discussion, the premises that underlie the categorization of the "passing" person as Black,
rather than the substance or truth of such designations, function as "discourse agreements."
69. In this Article, "white authority" broadly refers to discursive practices which employ or defer to
the discourse agreements of white supremacy.
70. The so-called tragedy of the mulatto, contrary to Williamson's belief, is not that he suffers "ex-
treme discrimination within the Negro world," WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 190, but that he is "almost
white"-his tragic flaw or moral weakness is his partial African ancestry. Cf supra notes 58-59 (dis-
cussing Frederickson's view of the inferiority of persons with partial Black ancestry and Williamson's
discussion of the participation of a mulatto elite in the Harlem Renaissance).
Vol. 18:297, 2000
"Passing" Revisited
hind development of alternative tests of racial recognition involve the first or-
der mystification of the so-called "Black within."
The second order mystification occurs in Plessy v. Ferguson where the Su-
preme Court exploits the legal fiction of the "Black within" to justify Black
subordination under the regime of "separate but equal." The Court's construc-
tion of "passing" as transgression and its bestowal of purity and privilege on
whiteness depends on the concept of the "Black within." Moreover, it will be
argued, the "Black within" assumes an antecedent condition of Blackness that
can only be verified by the presence of visual Blackness.
Finally, in a reductio ad absurdum of the logic of "passing," the argument
turns to the late twentienth century case of Susie Phipps, the Louisiana woman
who sued to become white under the state's Black blood law and lost. The
Phipps case is useful for what it reveals about how Black subjectivity is con-
stituted and the improbability that a visibly Black person could ever disprove
her documentary designation as Black.
A. The Harper Doctrine: The Legal Status of the "Passing" Person Defined
I know that this is a view of the subject that it is thought best for women to ignore
but where we see so many cases of mulattoes commanding higher prices, advertised
as 'fancy girls, " o is it not enough to make us shudder for the standard of morality
in our Southern homes.
-Ella Gertrude (Clanton) Thomas71
The insufficiency of whiteness as a purely visual idiom of racial ideology
was apparent to those living in slavocratic communities of the nineteenth cen-
tury and was a source of apprehension and dread well into the twentieth cen-
tury.72 Being white was a matter of blood, just as being Black was the pollution
of blood.73
Over time, the visual idiom of racial ideology proved unworkably ambigu-
ous to support a system of white supremacy based on racial slavery for the
Black alone. Sexual mixing resulting from both the purchase that European-
descended slavocrats had on the sexual lives of their African-descended cap-
tives 74 and the free play of common folk75 blurred the visual idiom. The pres-
71. VIRGINIA INGRAHAM BURR, THE SECRET EYE: THE JOURNAL OF ELLA GERTRUDE CLANTON
THOMAS, 1848-1889, at 168 (1990) (entry of Jan. 2, 1858).
72. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 63-97; cf. Gross, supra note 20, at 140 ("A litigant trying to
prove someone's blackness and slave status might have described the person as white in appearance,
while emphasizing the trickery involved in making that person appear white.").
73. See WINTHROP JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK 165-67 (1968) (tracing the "embryonic signifi-
cance" among early colonists of the notion of racial blood); WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 93.
74. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATrER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 40-47 (1978).
75. See id. at 42.
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ence among slavocrats of mixed people (both free and unfree) in sufficient
numbers challenged their basic tenet of racial slavery that freedom was for the
white and enslavement for the Black.76 The existence of "fancy girls" chal-
lenged the self-conception of white supremacy on the visual order.77 Whites,
according to the visual order, who had an African-descended ancestor or par-
ent, were slaves alongside Blacks. 78 These threats to the visual idiom contrib-
uted to the discursive supplementation and elaboration of whiteness. Consan-
guinity, if known, while sufficient for Blackness, was not sufficient for
whiteness. 79 Because Blackness would not remain on the surface, whiteness
had to be interiorized as well.
Legal discourse subscribed the elaboration of an interiorized whiteness by
enforcing an emerging vocabulary of racial definition and description.8 0 The
obiter dicta of Judge William Harper of South Carolina in 1835 is exemplary
for its rejection of the visual paradigm of race:
The condition of the individual is not to be determined solely by the distinct and
visible mixture of negro blood, but by reputation, by his reception into society, and
his having commonly exercised the privileges of a white man ... it may be well and
proper, that a man of worth, honesty, industry, and respectability, should have the
rank of a white man, while a vagabond of the same degree of blood should be con-
fined to the inferior caste .... It is hardly necessary to say that a slave cannot be a
white man.
s8
What cannot go without saying is that by 1850, though a slave could not be a
76. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 73.
77. Williamson reports that
Fredricka Bremer, a widely read Swedish writer and traveler, crossed the path of the trade in
"white" women as slaves several times during her journeys through America in 1850 and
1851. In a Washington slave pen she saw a "slave lady," a mulatto woman who had been
reared to sew, read, make conversation, and so on. She had become too "uppity," however,
and was being sold away to bring her down. In Richmond, in another slave pen, Bremer en-
countered a bevy of "fancy girls." She observed that "they were handsome fair mulattoes,
some of them almost white girls."
Id. at 69.
78. See id.
79. Although by 1940 the so-called one-drop rule was used in the interpretation of the antimiscege-
nation statutes of only seven states of the former slave South-seven other states electing the more lib-
eral one-eighth rule, two providing no statutory definition, and one having no prohibition at all-the
one-drop rule has come to exemplify the extreme limit of the racial imagination as an abandonment of
the visual order. As Williamson observes, long before we reach this limit it becomes necessary to begin
talk about "invisible blackness." Id. at 97-98.
80. Louisiana Creole society probably contributed more to the range of racial descriptions than any
other by distinguishing a person one-sixty-fourth Black as a "sang-mele," a person one-sixteenth black
as a "meamelouc," a person three-quarters Black as a "sambo," and a person seven-eighths Black as a
"mango." As Williamson reports, "mulatto" was an Iberian word, and "it was the gentlemen of the deep
South who virtually made a class out of 'quadroons' (a word of Spanish and French origins) and went
on sometimes to misappropriate 'mustee' from 'mestizo,' meaning a mixture of European and Indian,
and apply it to persons one-eighth black." Id. at 24; see also VIRGINIA R. DOMINGUEZ, WHITE BY
DEFINITION: SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION IN CREOLE LOUISIANA (1986).
81. State v. Cantey, 70 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 614, 616 (1835); see also White v. Tax Collector, 31 S.C.L.
(3 Rich.) 136, 141 (1846); Johnson v. Boon, 28 S.C.L. (I Speers) 268, 270 (S.C. 1843).
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white man, many men and women who could "pass" for white were legally
held as slaves, often enough, of their own family, simply by virtue of an Afri-
can-descended ancestor or parent.82 The mere presence of these "white slaves"
was a living refutation to a racial defense of the slave system, as well as a
source of moral terror for Southern white women whose own status in slavo-
cratic households seemed threateningly reflected in the lives of "fancy girls."
83
The rise of laws prohibiting miscegenation paralleled the need to create de-
scriptive categories that fit the distinctions that custom had made. 84 Thus, many
of our racial categories attempt an approximation in terms of degree of blood
or ancestry. 85 A "mulatto" has generally been understood to refer both to those
in whom the mixture of Black and white is visible, and to persons having one
Black and one white parent.86 Importantly, it is the divisible fraction of "Black
blood" in these categories that mattered for purposes of the legal proscription
of miscegenation. As the optimism implicit in perpetual slavery for Blacks was
destroyed on the field of battle, the quantum of "Black blood" necessary to be
Black became decidedly less generous. 87 The one-drop rule was merely the
82. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 63.
83. The diary entry of Ella Thomas which serves as the epigram of this section gives an indication
of white women's concerns about "fancy girls." Since captive women could not legally refuse the sexual
aggressions of slavocrats, and "fancy girls" were often kept as higher-priced concubines or courtesans,
from the perspective of white women, whose ability to refuse the venereal attentions of their husbands
was likewise limited by the law (but for a different set of reasons), white marriage came to resemble
forced prostitution. Moreover, as "fancy girls" were valued because they were "almost white," it became
more difficult for white women to use race as the measure of difference between how they were treated
by white men and how captive women were treated. See generally CATHERINE CLINTON, THE
PLANTATION MISTRESS: WOMAN'S WORLD IN THE OLD SOUTH (1982) (describing the ambiguous status
of elite white women in society that was both patriarchal and racist).
84. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 97.
85. See id.
86. See id. at xii.
87. The history of Virginia antimiscegenation laws bears out the climatic nature of these prohibi-
tions, reflecting the white optimism of the antebellum period and the white pessimism of the postbellum
period. Virginia first moved to discourage miscegenation in 1662 when it declared that mulatto children
of slave mothers would be slaves. See 2 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA
170 (New York, R. & W. & G. Bartow 1823), thus abandoning the English rule that the child followed
the status of the father. In 1691 the legislature imposed a heavy fine or a five year period of servitude on
Englishwomen who gave birth to "a bastard child by a Negro," and the child was to be sold as a servant
until he or she reached the age of thirty. Further, interracial couples who married were to be banished
"forever" from the colony within three months of the ceremony. See 3 HENING, supra, at 86-88. In 1705
the sentence imposed on whites who married Negroes or mulattoes was increased to include six months
in jail, and all mulatto children were made servants until they were thirty-one years old. See 3 HENING,
supra, at 447-62. The 1705 prohibition against Black/white marriage was reenacted in 1792 without
alteration, and without, unsurprisingly, a penalty of imprisonment imposed on the Black partner in
crime. See HMGGMOTHAM, supra note 74, at 46. Moreover, in 1848 the imprisonment of whites mar-
rying Blacks was increased to twelve months. See id. (citing JUNE PURCELL GUILD, BLACK LAWS OF
VIRGINIA 32 (1969)). Amended again in 1932, the statute finally imposed a penalty of imprisonment on
both Blacks and whites for intermarrying and the term was increased to confinement in the penitentiary
for one to five years. See id. (citing GUILD, supra, at 36). Because of these discriminatory laws, the
number of mulatto slaves increased dramatically during the eighteenth century in Virginia. Cf JORDAN,
supra note 73, at 137 (stating that racial intermixing was highest during this period). But the relatively
generous one-quarter fraction of "negro blood" defining the person whom whites could not marry held
until 1910. In that year, the fraction was lowered to one-sixteenth. Finally, in 1930 Virginia outlawed
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next logical step in the racial ideology of a preemptively broken slavocracy. 88
The standard announced by Judge Harper to determine the racial "condi-
tion" of the individual embodied the needs of the slavocracy (and the republic)
by marking the limits of the visual idiom ("not to be determined solely by dis-
tinct and visible mixture of negro blood"), by acknowledging the need for ac-
tive intervention on the part of the state to secure whiteness as valued property
("reputation"), by positing the de facto perpetuation of racially bifurcated so-
cial existence ("reception into society"), and making clear the purpose and
utility of racial distinctions was to serve the interests of white supremacy
("having commonly exercised the privileges of a white man"). Therefore, we
are not entitled to consider, as Judge Harper probably did, that his race deter-
minants are merely legal standards for deciphering facts; rather, they should be
seen as juridical imperatives for securing a white supremacy that has been
threatened with dissolution on the visual order. Judge Harper's coup de
grace--"a slave cannot be a white man"-sets up purity of blood, of character,
of liberty, and of personhood as natural barriers to the demise of race distinc-
tion through mixing.
The effect of the Harper doctrine was to make race anterior to any discus-
sion of race and to give whiteness and, in a distorted way, Blackness, an inte-
rior landscape. The Harper doctrine made whiteness natural, something that
resided internally in the purity of blood and character. As a just social conse-
quence of its purity, whiteness was rewarded externally with liberty and the
relations proper to personhood. Having been assigned the qualities of property
and the privileges of membership, whiteness, however, was not indefeasible.
Once whiteness was interrogated with respect to its authenticity, there was al-
ways a passing possibility of "passing." White paranoia generated by both the
socioeconomic desirability and judicial defeasibility of whiteness situates
Blackness at a subcutaneous, but nevertheless definitive level of the white
body. Discursively added to the interior landscape of the white subject is the
metaphorical figure of the Black homunculus, signifying the Blackness within
the white body.
This discursive marker of white interiority, the Black homunculus, will
emerge in any representation that places the visually effective whiteness of an
individual in doubt on the basis of a purported blood relation to Blacks.89 Nei-
ther the judicial nor the legislative mind has been immune from the habit of
raising such doubts. It is therefore not idle to question what assumptions about
race are carried forward in these articulations, to wonder to whose benefit they
marriage between whites with anyone with any "negro blood" at all. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at
97-98.
88. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 1, at 97-98.
89. See generally VALERIE BABB, WHITENESS VISIBLE: THE MEANING OF WHITENEss IN
AMERICAN LITERATURE AND CULTURE (1998).
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may accrue, and to challenge the mystifications contained in them.
B. Plessy's Prison: The Legal Status of the "Passing" Person
Constitutionalized
Let them be severely brought to book, when they go wrong, but by those who will
take the trouble to understand them.
-Learned Hand9°
The power of this thought figure of the "Blackness within" on the judicial
mind as an immovable discourse agreement among whites played a barely ac-
knowledged role at the end of the nineteenth century in the Supreme Court's
deservedly infamous separate-but-equal case, Plessy v. Ferguson.91 In fact, the
Black homunculus inside Homer Plessy was a key figure among the dramatis
personae. Plessy, in the racial lexicon of Louisiana, was an octoroon. In other
words, according to the conventions of the visual idiom, Plessy "passed" for
white. His arrest in Louisiana in 1892 for taking a seat in a train car reserved
for whites only was part of a legal strategy to end segregation in public trans-
portation.92 In a case laden with irony, the greatest irony may be that white
authority sought to adjudicate the exclusion from society of absent Blacks
through the medium of the figurative Black within the white body of Homer
Plessy.
Bernard Boxill has said that the claim in Plessy's plea that the mixture of
African blood was not discemable in him was "mainly a snare for the opposi-
tion"--and that "[c]annily, the court refused the snare. 93 It is true that the
Court, in its discussion of Plessy's claim, employs language that makes race
anterior to the discussion of race. Thus, even in the passage of the opinion most
noted for its virulent rejection of the claim of insult to Blacks implied by seg-
regation, the Court speaks as though the validity of race were beyond question:
[T]he underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument [consists] in the assumption that
the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of
inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solelyS 94
because the colored race chooses to put that construction on it.
By refusing Plessy's claim to whiteness, the Court actually disavowed respon-
sibility for the state's role in determining the racial condition of the individ-
ual-reputation, reception into society, and having commonly exercised the
90. THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 110 (Irving Dillard ed.,
1952).
91. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
92. See CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 28-43
(1987).
93. BOXILL, supra note 62, at 9.
94. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
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privileges of a white man.' However, the Plessy Court clearly understood, as
Judge Harper had over sixty years earlier, the white supremacist need for the
ruse that the visual idiom was insufficient to determine whiteness. The segre-
gation of the "two races" put Homer Plessy on the nonwhite side of the race
line, despite the testimony of the eyes, because race was not merely a matter of
color. Additionally, the Black homunculus inside the white body had to be ac-
counted for, vicariously disciplined, and separated from pure whiteness.
Plessy's whiteness could be suspended because "passing" was possible. The
decision against Plessy required him to perform Blackness so that the Black
within could be excluded. In this sense, it is hard to imagine a more unabashed
judicial theatricalization of minstrelsy,95 of white power talking to itself.
It is well to recall that Plessy claimed both a denial of equal protection
96
and a denial of property-whiteness-without due process. According to his
brief, the "reputation" of being white "has an actual pecuniary value," of which
he would be deprived without due process of law if a train employee could ar-
bitrarily refuse to seat him in the whites-only train car. 97 Again, the Court re-
fused the snare, asserting that the issue of Plessy's race did not "properly arise
upon the record." 98 But then, the Court went on to conclude that, "[i]f he be a
white man and assigned to a colored coach, he may have his action for dam-
ages against the company for being deprived of his so-called property." 99 Thus,
without ever articulating a rule of racial definition, the Court upheld the Harper
doctrine with respect to the need for active intervention on the part of the state
to secure whiteness as valued property and with respect to making clear that
the purpose and utility of racial distinctions was to serve the interests of white
supremacy. Plessy's so-called property rights were to be determined as a mat-
ter of state law, where it was assumed that "if he be a colored man" he had
none.
The insistence that Plessy should be read as a case about the legal status of
the "passing" person, as well as a case about Black subordination, arises from
the coincidence of the evasion of Plessy's claim to whiteness with the existen-
tial situation of whiteness at large. It is not simply that whiteness is structured
as the ability to "pass" (over, muster, by), but also the right to pass judgment
with or without evidence, with or without rational rules of definition, and with
or without jurisdiction over the person proscribed. Thus, Plessy's failed "pass-
ing" puts into circulation its deligitimating significations: to pass off a fake as
genuine, to trespass on another's property, to pass for what one is not, to pass
on contamination, and finally, to pass away. Rather more importantly, evasion
95. See generally LOTT, supra note 61 (discussing minstrelsy).
96. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542.





takes place against the unstable backdrop of a visually over-determined (tyran-
nized) Blackness. Judicial scrutiny of race in Plessy reinforces white discourse
agreements concerning the racial condition of the individual in order to restrict
the liberty and affront the personhood of Blacks. Heightened scrutiny of race
should be expected to confront the basis of white racial identity and, conse-
quently, white authority.
C. The Case of Susie Phipps: A Critique of State-Enforced Racial
Classification
There is no way to determine just how many mixed-bloods have chosen [passing],
and how many, for reasons of affection, family ties, etc., have declined the opportu-
nity. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that manifold numbers of "white"
Americans in fact carry some degree of black blood in their veins, although in most
instances, probably unconsciously.
-John G. Mencke l°°
Reading forward in time across the tableau of judicial encounters with
"passing,"'' l the most recently celebrated case of Doe v. State of Louisiana,10 2
in which several members of the Guillory family sued unsuccessfully to be
designated white on their birth certificates, 103 would seem to be as imperfect an
exemplar as Plessy. In a sense, the lawsuit itself disqualifies the case as an at-
tempt at "passing" since, traditionally conceived, "passing" is a secretive affair,
the silent insinuation of the "passer" into a community of whites whose only
referents for race are status and the visual idiom.10 4 By openly demanding offi-
cial designation as white, the Guillory family tipped its hand to the state of
Louisiana, whose long history of racially motivated legislation revealed that it
did not accept the constraints of the visual idiom. Rather, Louisiana, true to its
Latin origins, enlarged on the visual idiom by inventing fractional definitions
of race. At the time the Guillory family brought its case, one-thirty-second or
less of Negro blood was needed to be designated white in Louisiana.10 5
100. JOHN G. MENCKE, MULATTOES AND RACE MIXTURE 9 (1979).
101. It is beyond the scope of this Article to review individually the copious body of judicial cases
in which the issue of "passing" has been adjudicated. A representative sampling of cases would include:
Sunseri v. Cassagne, 185 So. 1 (La. 1938); Green v. City of New Orleans, 88 So. 2d 76 (La. Ct. App.
1956); State ex rel. Francis v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 179 So. 2d 681 (La. Ct. App. 1965); State
ex rel. Heno v. Drake, 176 So. 2d 226 (La. Ct. App. 1965); State ex rel. Treadaway v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Health, 56 So. 2d 249 (La. Ct. App. 1952); Malone v. Civil Service Commission, 646 N.E.2d 150
(Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
102. 479 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
103. Seeid. at 371.
104. See Winthrop Jordan, American Chiaroscuro: The Status and Definition of Mulattoes in the
British Colonies, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 183, 191 (1962) ("The success of the passing mechanism de-
pended upon its operating in silence. Passing was a conspiracy of silence not only for the individual but
for a biracial society which had drawn a rigid color line based on visibility.").
105. See Doe, 479 So. 2d at 371. See also Diamond & Cottrol, supra note 20, at 257.
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The advantage of fractional definitions of race over the one-drop rule had
always been the ability of white authority to flex to meet changing social con-
ditions.1 6 In the ebb and flow of the racial boundary, then, we see not a chal-
lenge to white authority, but the fetishism of whiteness as the only source of
social, even if no longer legal, privilege and esteem. 0 7 The outcry among
commentators induced by the Guillory case, and the embarrassment of Louisi-
ana officials who were eventually persuaded to abandon the so-called "Black
Blood Law," was related to the fact that this battle was taking place in 1982-
83-twenty-eight years after the Brown108 era had begun and fifteen years after
Loving.10 9 Clearly, these decisions could not have had the effect of making race
irrelevant; but they should have had the effect of putting state officials on no-
tice that the legal enforcement of race classifications was of dubious constitu-
tional validity.
As reported by Calvin Trillin, 110 the Guillory case first arose in 1977 from
a dispute between Susie Guillory Phipps and the Louisiana Department of
Health and Human Resources over the designation of her parents as "Col." on
her birth certificate.' Phipps had been born in Louisiana in 1934 and had
grown up in Acadia Parish in a poor French-speaking farm family. 12 When she
found herself in need of a passport for the first time at the age of forty-three,
Phipps drove from her home in Sulfur, Louisiana, to the Division of Vital Rec-
ords in New Orleans to obtain a copy of her birth certificate, which she needed
for the passport application. For forty-three years, in Trillin's words, Phipps
106. See Tanya Kateri Hernndez, "Multiracial" Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of
Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 124-28 (1998) (arguing that the structural recognition of
intermediate racial groups of mixed Black and white ancestry in places as diverse as Brazil, parts of
Latin America, apartheid South Africa, and certain parts of the U.S. South have historically functioned
as a "buffer" class, receiving greater privileges than Blacks, but fewer than whites). Hemndez argues
persuasively that structural recognition of racial buffer classes tracks demographic patterns in which
Blacks outnumber a ruling white elite that therefore feels compelled to share its privileges with the mid-
dle-tier group while continuing to subordinate Blacks. See id; see also CARL N. DEGLER, NEITHER
BLACK NOR WHITE: SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES 103 (1971)
(discussing the gradations of color and the higher ranking of value attached to those closest to white);
DOMINGUEZ, supra note 80, at 121-22 (describing the Louisiana legislature's formation of a militia
corps comprised solely of Creoles).
107. In Bowen v. Independent Publishing Co., 96 S.E.2d 564 (S.C. 1957), the Supreme Court of
South Carolina upheld a libel action by a white person against a newspaper for publishing an article in
which she was identified as a "Negro," citing the majority view that calling a person "colored" when
that person is white is actionable per se.
108. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (forbidding de jure segregation in public
schools as a violation of the equal protection clause).
109. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (forbidding laws that ban interracial marriage between
Blacks and whites); see also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits a state from divesting a divorced white woman of custody of her child, on petition of
the child's natural father, because of the mother's remarriage to a Black man).




"lived as a white woman .... Nobody had challenged any of that." '113 But what
she discovered when she examined her birth certificate sent Phipps into shock
and, according to her own recollection, she was sick for three days.
1 14
Phipps would say often, "I was brought up white, I married white twice."
1 15
Her shock, therefore, which provided the impetus for her quest to become
white, did not relate to any limitations placed on her life or her marriage. As
Trillin reports, Mr. Phipps expressed his support for his wife by saying, "Hell,
she ain't a nigger."' 16 Rather, Phipps required vindication of her creed, "I am
white," which referred not simply to her color, as Trillin supposes, but to her
race. It should be underscored that, unlike Plessy, dismantling Jim Crow segre-
gation was not at stake, nor, as Trillin correctly observes, were voting rights,
lunch counters, or seat assignments on the public buses.1 7 This case was about
Phipps' right to claim a nineteenth-century version of racial whiteness and be
believed.
Let us remind ourselves again of the elements of that version: Whiteness
was a matter of blood lines. Blackness was the pollution of blood. Freedom
was for the white, enslavement for the Black. And yet, under the benevolent
offices of Judge Harper, the racial condition of the individual was not to be
determined solely by distinct and visible mixture of "negro blood," of which
Phipps apparently showed no signs. The judge should also consider reputation,
reception into society, and whether the individual commonly exercised the
privileges of a white man.
We begin to get a sense of what made Phipps sick, but from what perspec-
tive? Presumably Phipps' parents, designated Black on her birth certificate,
were closer to her in affinity than a distant great-great-great-great grandpar-
ent."' But in fact, Phipps' ancestor, Margarita, was adduced by the state
against her claim to whiteness and admitted into evidence." 9 This meant that
Phipps had all this time been "passing": At school, at work, in her marriages,
and even in her family home as a child, Phipps had crossed Louisiana's elastic
yet definitive race line as a fugitive great-great-great-great granddaughter of a
once captive Black woman. Shock and nausea are part of the grand narrative of
white supremacist discourse when white and Black come into too close of
contact.
Nevertheless, we should not yield to the urge to vomit rather than digest the
fetid fruits of the Guillory case. The grounds on which we might seek to di-
113. Id. at 64.
114. Seeid.at62.
115. Id. at 63. Even the attorney who defended the department's refusal to alter Phipps' birth cer-
tificate came to remark, "Susie looks like a white person." Id.
116. Id. at 74.
117. See id. at 64.
118. See id. at 71.
119. Seeid.at 78.
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minish this case abound. As an instance of racial atavism, it represents an ad-
mittedly localized legal discursive return to biologism that, at least de jure, has
been superannuated.12 With respect to the legal status of the "passing" person,
we have already noted its limitations. And as an example of Black subordina-
tion, there is precious little at stake beyond the power of self-nomination with-
out government imposition. Belatedly, that power (limited to the universe of
ready-made racial categories, of course) has been granted.12' Phipps did get to
be white in Louisiana, whether through repeal of the Black blood law or by
sinking back into the obscurity of first-time encounters. It is at this point, how-
ever, that rigor demands that we inquire further into the fate of Margarita, who,
as unimpeachable evidence of Phipps' Blackness, is said to be "history."'
' 22
Margarita's relevance to the Guillory case raises important questions for
critical methodology. Since Susie Phipps herself "look[ed] like a white per-
son," the proof of her Blackness had to proceed genealogically, which is to say,
historically, through the examination and presentation of documents and rec-
ords. Such records as remain of Margarita's existence, however, describe her
as a "slave,"' 23 and then later a "free Negress."' 124 So perhaps the first question
that confronts a race critical methodology is whether there can be written
documentary evidence of Blackness that is not visibly apparent. Further, can
such evidence be drawn from records made during a period when the power of
self-nomination without government imposition was formally denied to all and
practically to most? In other words, in order to prove that Susie Phipps was
Black, the state first had to prove that Margarita was Black. But if Phipps could
escape her Blackness, not only by the testimony of the eyes, but by exercising
the power of self-nomination, where does that leave Margarita? Following
Judge Harper's lead, is the fact that Margarita was held captive by a slavocrat
evidence that determines she could not be white and must therefore be Black?
Moreover, the description of Margarita as a "free Negress," rather than a mu-
latto or quadroon or octoroon, which seems primafacie to save the inference of
her visible Blackness, actually complicates matters more in the case of Susie
Phipps' invisible Blackness. Could Margarita, like her great-great-great-great
granddaughter, ever disprove the authenticity of her documentary designation
120. After the decision of the trial court in Doe v. Louisiana, the so-called "Black blood" law, LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:267 (1970), that defined a white person as "one who has one-thirty-second or
less of Negro blood" was repealed. See 1983 La. Acts 811 ("To repeal R.S. 42:267, relative to the crite-
rion for signification of race by public officials in Louisiana, and otherwise to provide with respect
thereto. Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana: Section 1 R. S. 42:267 is hereby repealed in its
entirety.").
121. The racial categories used by the Federal Census Bureau in the last decade were (1)American
Indian or Alaska Native (2) Asian (3) Black or African American (4) Hispanic or Latino (5) Native Ha-
waiian or Other Pacific Islander (6) White. See 62 Fed. Reg. 58,789 (1997).
122. See Trillin, supra note 110, at 78.
123. Id.at 71.
124. Id. at 78.
Vol. 18:297, 2000
"Passing" Revisited
despite the presumption created by her visible Blackness? The answer must be
"no.' ' 125 But if this answer is correct, we must further suppose either of two
conflicting possible readings of Margarita's relation to Phipps. Either a Black
ancestor can generate white progeny or the Blackness of an ancestor is a per-
manent stain that is present though not visible in persons who only appear to be
white.1 26 Of course, the latter possibility is the one that has been upheld judi-
cially under the one drop rule and reflects what I have called a discourse
agreement of white supremacy.
Despite their separation in space, time and circumstances, one must not
overlook the extent to which the racial situation of Margarita resembles that of
Jacqueline Green more than that of Susie Phipps. If we place the three women,
Susie Phipps, Margarita and Jacqueline Green, side by side, the differences
between Margarita and Green, on the one hand, and Phipps, on the other,
emerge. There is Phipps, who looks white but who is designated by the law as
Black; there is Margarita, who presumably looked Black and is designated
Black; and there is Jacqueline Green, who looked Black but is designated
white. Based on appearance alone, Green could not start out being legally des-
ignated as Black and later be reclassified as white. In this respect, she resem-
bles Margarita. However, Green in fact starts out being designated by the law
as white because she has a white mother, but the efficacy of this designation is
put into question due to her medium brown color. Margarita's is the presump-
tively easy case: She starts out Black, is designated Black, and remains Black,
even after death. (Green starts out white, but her claim to whiteness is under-
mined by her appearance, because in those contexts she is encountered as col-
ored.) By contrast, Susie Phipps starts out colored by law but, based on appear-
ance alone, lives her entire life as white and is later reclassified as white. The
very thing that enables Phipps to become white by law-her appearance in the
context of first-time encounters--disables Green from maintaining her status as
white and makes impossible any claim that Margarita might have to whiteness.
Margarita's assumed color functions as a gravitational constant in racial
discourse. Her visible Blackness leaps out across durational time to snag even
the blonde-haired and blue-eyed by her definition. Her power is not merely
125. The answer must be "no" even if Henry Louis Gates, Jr. is correct that, "[t]he mistake is to
assume that birth certificates and biographical sketches and all the other documents generated by the
modem bureaucratic state reveal an anterior truth-that they are merely signs of an independently ex-
isting identity. But in fact they constitute it." Henry Louis Gates, Jr., White Like Me, THE NEW YORKER,
June 17, 1996, at 78. For even after it is revealed that documents generated by the modem bureaucratic
state constitute a legal (racial) identity, it would remain to show the way in which ideology constitutes a
social (racial) identity through the rules of racial recognition upon which the law relies. It is an over-
statement of the power of the law simply to assert with Gates that "[t]he social meaning of race is estab-
lished by these identity papers." Id.
126. See generally James W. Gordon, Did the First Justice Harlan Have a Black Brother? 15 NEW
ENG. L. REv. 159 (1993) (connecting Justice Harlan's "progressive views on race" to the possibility that
he had a Black half-brother who is described as "blue-eyed, light-skinned Robert"). In what socially
meaningful sense is "blue-eyed, light-skinned Robert" Black, other than as a stain?
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historical, but transhistorical. In legal discursive terms, Margarita is not just
some evidence of Susie Phipps's Blackness. She is conclusive evidence. The
late twentieth-century synthesis of the nineteenth-century attempt to fix racial
condition by status and circumstances of birth completes the circuit of white
supremacist discourse agreements through employment of an unalterable set of
signifiers, duly recorded, "slave" and "free Negress."
Moreover, Margarita's fate provides us with semiotic insight on the figure
of the Black homunculus. Her visually-coerced, government-backed, discur-
sively-overdetermined Blackness sets the stage for the "passing" person's di-
lemmas of social and economic mobility within a racial spoils system. Her
serviceability to white authority's need to intimidate through mechanisms of
control and exclusion consummates the mise en scene of raciality itself. Her
epidermalized presence in the body politic is background that intrudes into the
foreground only to be left behind (until needed) again. She is more of an ema-
nation from a dusty document than an actual presence; she is more spectral
than substantial reality; she was left for dead. Margarita's role as evidence of
unimpeachable Blackness in a dispute among whites about access to whiteness
encapsulates what is intended to be described by the expression Black homun-
culus.
Finally, Margarita's fate in legal historiography leads to a consideration of
how Black subjectivity is constructed, not merely in law through recordation of
an unalterable set of racial signifiers, but in society as well through the opera-
tion of first-time encounters. The assumption of her visible Blackness created
by the signifiers is rooted in the social experience of those for whom the visual
idiom of racial ideology is insufficient to determine whiteness, but who none-
theless find themselves reliant on the visual apprehension of Blackness in order
to guarantee the stability and persuasiveness of the color line.
III. BLACK BY POPULAR DEMAND: FIRST-TIME ENCOUNTERS AND THE USES
OF "PASSING" IN POPULAR CONSCIOUSNESS
Naturally for the convenience and clarity of my little theoretical theatre I have had
to present things in the form of a sequence, with a before and an after, and thus in
the form of a temporal succession. Individuals are walking along. Somewhere (usu-
ally behind them) the hail rings out: "Hey, you there!" One individual (nine times
out of ten it is the right one) turns around, believing/suspecting/knowing that it is
for him, i.e. recognizing that "it really is he" who is meant by the hailing. In real-
ity, however, these things happen without any succession. The existence of ideology










Even though they mark relatively brief, ephemeral social interactions, first
time encounters should be the principal vector of insight on racial ideology. It
is perhaps safe to say that every other experience of racialization, including its
documentary production within the law, has as its origin the visual apprehen-
sion of difference, which seemingly naturally and simultaneously is catego-
rized as an apprehension of racial difference.
Thus, racial truth claims take on an air of self-evidence in social contexts
devoted to the purity of social identities. Yet the issue that is logically prior to
the question of purity, the validity of the categories of racial discourse, typi-
cally is never posed. In the Fanonian interpellation, "Look, a Negro," it is not
possible to look and not "see" the Negro, or if one fails to see the Negro the
failure is not due to some fault of the communication. The Negro passed too
quickly. Or he was never there, and someone is playing a joke. Or the Negro is
hiding, perhaps beneath the mask of white skin.
The person subjected to the hail of "Negro" finds that his options are like-
wise limited. This is so because the Fanonian interpellation functions as a ra-
cial truth claim that demands from the person subjected to it recognition that it
is really he who is meant by the hailing. To be on the receiving end of the ra-
cial gaze and the target of discrimination is a simultaneous operation.
This is the interpellative aspect of racial ideology: self-recognition in the
categories imposed by others, from which the subject cannot take flight, so
long as the validity of the categories retains the force of common sense and
popular acknowledgement. Even as the factors 129 to be considered have shifted
emphasis over time, lack of social mobility with respect to racial identity has
been the historical fate of the visibly Black subject since the first racial defense
of slavery. It is for this reason that I have concluded that to be Black is to be
visually overdetermined.
130
In the context of a first-time encounter, such as that described by Fanon,
128. FRANZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 109 (1967).
129. There are at least six means by which racial identity is typically determined during first-time
encounters. These include visual appearance (or the eyeball test), name or surname, context or status,
self-nomination or proclamation, and voice or spoken language.
130. It is undeniable that layers of social, political, and economic meaning have been antecedently
encoded around Blackness and are automatically triggered by the sight of a Black person to the detri-
ment or outright denial of individual characteristics or differences. In recognition of this dynamic, Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., expressed the hope that someday his children would be judged not "by the color of
their skin, but by the content of their character." Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech at the
Civil Rights March on Washington (Aug. 28, 1963), in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL
WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 217, 219 (James M. Washington ed., 1986).
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Fanon is simply walking down the street, minding his own business when he is
confronted by a racial interpellation. In that context, the operative rule of racial
recognition is clearly based on a visual apprehension of Fanon. Without
knowledge of Fanon's parentage, ancestry, self-identification, spoken lan-
guage, education, class, or national or cultural affiliation-Fanon is appre-
hended as "a Negro" and is thereby made to see himself as a Black subject. But
the notion of a first-time encounter should not be limited to being accosted
verbally on the street,13 1 for first-time encounters occur anytime an individual
exposes herself to a public in which racial ideology is endemic.' 32 Both verbal
and nonverbal signals cue the racial subject that he or she is an outsider to
someone else's inside and thus establish both a division and a hierarchy of ra-
cialized bodies.' 33 Interpellation as a racial subject thus occurs within a social
context where the corporeal schema of racial ideology is already firmly estab-
lished and race functions as the ultimate trope of difference. As Althusser ad-
monishes, "[t]he existence of ideology and the hailing or interpellation of indi-
viduals are one and the same thing."'
34
Just as the Althusserian notion of interpellation grounds the racial subject
outside (at least, initially) of any internal consciousness of subjects thus hailed,
the Fanonian description of a first-time encounter links up with the notion of
prejudice as both bias and injury. The law's prohibition on racially discrimi-
natory acts leaves untouched the underlying phenomenon of prejudice, and ar-
guably relies on its perpetuation. It is left to cultural institutions, if at all, to
contend with prejudice. But in the absence of an effective distinction between
racial subject-located outside of consciousness-and racial identity-lodged
within consciousness-the discourse agreements of white authority are merely
recirculated and further entrenched. Race may still be seen as "an essence, a
natural phenomenon, whose meaning is fixed, as constant as a southern
star."'135 The uses of "passing" in popular consciousness, in particular, reveal
the circuitry of this ideological entrenchment.
The concept of "passing" in popular consciousness shares certain repetitive
themes that center on experiences of imposture and mistaken identity encoun-
131. See Davis, supra note 67, at 1565 (describing microaggressions as "subtle, stunning, often
automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which are 'put downs' of blacks by offenders"); Chester M.
Pierce, et al., An Experiment in Racism: TV Commercials, in TELEVISION AND EDUCATION 62, 87-88
(Chester M. Pierce ed., 1978) (concluding, based on an empirical study, that there are numerous and
excessive negative representations of Black persons in TV commercials). Being called "a Negro" or
"Black" need not be considered a put down. The aggression occurs when the speaker intends it that way.
132. See Lawrence, supra note 35, at 322 (stating that "Americans share a common historical and
cultural heritage in which racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared expe-
rience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individ-
ual's race and induce negative feelings and opinions about nonwhites.").
133. Fanon calls this division and hierarchy of racialized bodies the "corporeal schema" of racial
ideology. FRANZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WI-TE MASKS 111 (1967).
134. Althusser, supra note 51, at 163.
135. OMI & WINANT, supra note 63, at 13.
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ters. 136 As in Werner Sollors' documentation of the thematics of "passing,"'137
the "passing" person has been portrayed in American literature as a runaway
slave, 138 a cross-dresser,' 39 a parvenu or emigrant, 140 a spy, 14 1 a trickster or re-
bel,142 a victim or coward, 143 a self-serving opportunist,144 a traitor to kin,
145
and a criminal. 146 These tropes serve as the vehicles through which the "pass-
136. Narratives that focus on the social experience of characters of partial African ancestry who
nevertheless can "pass" for white include: WILLIAM DEAN HOWELLS, AN IMPERATIVE DUTY (1891);
MARK TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON (1894); CHARLES W. CHESTNUTT, THE HOUSE BEHIND THE
CEDARS (1900); JAMES WELDON JONNSON, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN Ex-COLOURED MAN (1927);
JESSIE FAUSET, PLUM BUN (1928); NELLA LARSEN, PASSING (1929); FANNIE HURST, IMITATION OF
LIFE (1933); GOD'S STEPCHILDREN (Micheaux Book & Film Co. 1938), ALIEN LAND (Willard Savoy
1949); LOST BOUNDARIES (Warner Studios 1949); and PINKY (20th Century Fox 1949).
137. See WERNER SOLLORS, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE YET BOTH: THEMATIC EXPLORATIONS
OF INTERRACIAL LITERATURE 246-84 (1997).
138. Sollors speculates that the first uses of "passing" to signify "crossing the color line" appeared
in notices concerning runaway slaves. See id. at 255. As evidence of this early usage, see RICHARD
HILDRETH, THE SLAVE; OR, MEMOIRS OF ARCHY MOORE (Boston, Bela Marsh 1836) (including text of
Charles Moore's advertisement of five hundred dollars reward for the recapture of Archy and Cassy,
two runaway slaves and Moore's children, who may attempt to "pass for white"); HARRIET BEECHER
STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN 70 (Boston, John H. Eastbum 1851) (quoting advertisement for the re-
capture of George Harris, a runaway slave, whom the subscriber states may "try to pass for a white
man"). The trope of the "passer" as runaway slave is also developed in MARK TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD
WILSON (Hartford, American Publ'g Co. 1894) (telling the story of the consequences of slave baby
(read Black) and free baby (read white) switched at birth).
139. See generally WILLIAM CRAFT, RUNNING A THOUSAND MILES FOR FREEDOM (1969) (re-
counting the legendary escape from slavery of William and Ellen Craft in which Ellen disguised herself
as a white master of her slave William).
140. As Sollors shows, the emigrant, as one who changes society by geographical relocation, and
the parvenu, as one who changes society by social climbing, are linked to a primary condition for the
emergence of "passing" themes in nineteenth and twentieth century literature: geographic mobility and
the anonymity of cities. See SOLLORS, supra note 137, at 247-48. Thus, the portrayal of "passing" de-
scends from a tradition that makes a motif of the character with no known or suspicious origins and the
social upstart. See generally GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT, MARIE; OR, SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES
(Barbara Chapman, trans., Stanford University Press 1958) (1835) (representing a person of partial Afri-
can ancestry as a parvenu and emigrant); CHARLES CHESNUrF, THE HOUSE BEHIND THE CEDARS (1900)
(representing a "passer" as an emigrant); VICTOR HUGO, BUG-JARGAL (Paris, Urban Canel 1826) (tell-
ing the story of rich planter of "doubtful color" who switches from the white side to the Black side dur-
ing a rebellion).
141. See generally JAMES FENIMORE COOPER, THE SPY (Philadelphia, Coney, Leon, and Blanchard
1836) (telling the story of a white slaveowner who pretends to be a slave in order to escape imprison-
ment during the revolutionary war).
142. See generally FRANK WEBB, THE GARIES AND THEIR FRIENDS (1969) (representing voluntary
"passing" character as both a spy and trickster on white racist sensibilities).
143. See generally, e.g., id. (representing involuntary "passing" character as psychologically tor-
mented by his secret and complicit in racist joking).
144. See SOLLORS, supra note 137, at 257 (stating that the "passing" character of Victor Hugo's
novel Bug-Jargal "maintains this [white] identity only as long as it is advantageous; at the height of the
revolution, when he is in the hands of the black rebels, he changes his tune and now declares with some
pathos that he is a Mulatto").
145. See LANGSTON HUGHES, Passing, in THE WAYS OF WHITE FOLKS 49 (treating ironically a
"passing" theme with an epistolary story in which the letter writer apologizes to his own mother for not
having greeted her in the street in downtown Chicago).
146. The origins of "passing" in the concerns of slavocrats marked its detection from the very start
as a criminological investigation wherein Black signified guilt. As the narrator of Gustave de
Beaumont's novel, Marie, is made to complain:
Public opinion, ordinarily so indulgent to fortune-seekers who conceal their names and previ-
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ing" person confronts or evades in her dealings (mostly) with whites the di-
lemma of a blood relation to Black family members. Thus, the situation of the
"passing" person in popular portrayals is inherently anxiety-ridden and melo-
dramatic. As an imposter, one who does not "correct" the mistaken assumption
of whiteness, the "passing" person withholds the secret of Black identity be-
neath the camouflage of white subjectivity.147
In the melodrama of the "passing" narrative, the infamy of escape from or
return to the Black community is everywhere sentimentalized, moralized, and
made the object of nostalgia. This plantation aesthetic has proven to be re-
markably durable for a discourse whose basic logic is to impose penalties on
Blacks for being Black, to punish the "Black within" when the visible Black is
nowhere in sight, and to criminalize escape attempts from a racial caste system
that provides no exit. The distinction between subjective experience, through
which individuals are coerced by racial categories, and identity, on which indi-
viduals exercise agency and choice, is a necessary, albeit routinely ignored,
condition for articulation of the dilemma of escape or return in the "passing"
narrative. Although an improbable target of the Fanonian interpellation, "Look,
a Negro!," the "passing" person in popular consciousness is an individual who,
based on identity alone, would feel certain that it is really he who is meant by
the hailing.
Thus, the narrator of James Weldon Johnson's controversial novel, The
Autobiography of an Ex-Coloured Man, is tormented by the question of his ra-
cial identity and expresses an irresistable need to divulge the secret he has
"guarded more carefully than any of [his] earthly possessions."' 148 Johnson's
narrator, who never gives his name throughout the novel, ultimately decides he
will "neither disclaim the black race nor claim the white race; but [decided]
that [he] would change [his] name, raise a moustache, and let the world take
[him] for what it would."'
149
Commenting on this gesture, the literary critic Judith R. Berzon accuses
Johnson's narrator of deceit. She concludes that, "since he does not look like a
Negro, according to the conception of most whites, he must know that he will
be treated as a white man. Once that occurs, he will have to practice some con-
ous lives, is pitiless in its search for proofs of African descent... There is but one crime, of
which the guilty bear everywhere the penalty and the infamy; it is that of belonging to a fam-
ily reputed to be of color.-Though the color may be effaced, the stigma remains. It seems as
if men could guess it, when they could no longer see it. There is no asylum so secret, no re-
treat so secure as to conceal it.
SOLLORS, supra note 137, at 257. In this passage, "passing" becomes the metonymic displacement of
the runaway slave's "theft" of himself. Rather than recapture, however, the penalty for "passing" is a
symbolic and social, if not a material and physical, return to the Black community. In other words, the
penalty is the infamy of that return.
147. See Tyler, supra note 30, at 214-15 (describing conceptual artist Adrian Piper as "camou-
flaged" in her encounters with other whites).
148. JOHNSON, supra note 136, at 3.
149. Id. at 190.
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scious deception . ... ,,10 Berzon is able to conclude that the narrator's deci-
sion to "pass" is deceitful only because she assumes the "one-drop rule" con-
ception of race. Since the ex-coloured man appears to be white, he would be
treated as white, which would be deceitful because, for Berzon and many oth-
ers, the "passing" person is really Black. Such nonsense has brought not only
many fictional characters to grief, but also many living characters as well.151
In the terms suggested by this modest theatrum philosophicum, the ex-
coloured man is interpellated as white and is (subjectively) white because he
"passes" for white. But everyone who is white "passes" for white. If there is
deception, it is in the project underwritten by the one-drop rule of determining
race by rigorous examination and documentation of ancestral ties. This strictly
legal undertaking is not merely reductive and circular; it too, just as the critic
of "passing" who complains that a white man only appears to be white, must
end by holding simulacra to be originals--or in more Freudian terms, that on-
togeny recapitulates phylogeny-thereby transposing the subjective experience
of Blackness to an internal process of identification and blood.
This transposition of subjectivity and identity points to another peculiar
feature of the racial condition of the "passing" person, namely the necessity of
proclaiming one's Blackness in the context of first-time encounters in order to
correct the mistaken assumption of whiteness. Whereas the common subjective
experience of Blackness is visually overdetermined-to be Black by popular
demand-the "passing" person only becomes Black in such contexts by proc-
lamation, which is considered a revelation of the true self. The conceptual artist
Adrian Piper has made a career of such outings of herself.152 The credibility of
Piper's proclamation of her Blackness depends, however, on transposition and
the exaggeration of her "Negroid" features. In order to make her Blackness
visible, Piper finds that she must exaggerate and remonstrate with other
150. JuDiTH R. BERZON, NEITHER WHITE NOR BLACK: THE MULATTO CHARACTER IN AMERICAN
FICTIoN 156 (1978).
151. In the epigram that precedes his essay on the life of Anatole Broyard, Henry Louis Gates, Jr.
tells us that "Broyard wanted to be a writer, not a black writer. So he chose to live a lie rather than be
trapped by the truth." See Gates, supra note 125, at 66. Broyard's "truth" according to Gates was that he
was really Black although he "passed for white" among all those who were unaware of his family back-
ground. Indeed, Gates remarks that Broyard "kept the truth even from his own children." Id. This be-
comes in Gates's essay one of the most salient aspects of Broyard's anguished racial imposture, which
went so far that he once cut out the contributor's note from an early article that he had written because it
referred to his "first hand" knowledge of the situation of the American Negro. And yet, much of
Broyard's anguish, as Gates correctly points out, is a product not of his own creation, but of the mod-
ernist demand for authenticity. Coupled to this demand for authenticity, however, is also the continuing
acceptance--certainly during Broyard's life and even today-of the nineteenth century notion of racial
blood. Under such conditions, Broyard's "passing" is neither deceit nor living a lie, as Gates suggests;
rather, it is best understood as submission to the hail of his subjective experience.
152. See Piper, supra note 30, at 213 (including a 1981 pencil sketch by the artist entitled, "Self-
Portrait Exaggerating My Negroid Features"); see also Adam Shatz, Black Like Me, LNGUAFRANCA,
Nov. 1998, at 39 (reviewing Piper's artistic installations from 1968 to the present).
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whites.153 Nevertheless, as Carole-Anne Tyler insightfully observes, "Piper re-
peats in uncanny fashion that which she would critique. She assumes she can
see-or hear-who is white, interpellating people as white by giving them her
card. She divides the world into black and white, passing over people of color
unless they are (black) like her and share her sense of what racism is."' 154 im-
plicitly, then, the transposition of subjectivity and identity, required in the
"passing" narrative, cannot be articulated coherently without resort to visible
(that is to say, unmistakable) Blackness as its epistemological guarantee.
This is especially so with regard to visual, as opposed to literary, represen-
tations of "passing." At some indefinite yet undeniable point, it is no longer
possible to "see" the Black. Having reached that point, the "passing" person's
Blackness becomes an insider's joke, representable only through proclamation,
exaggeration, and association with other visible Blacks.1 55 In the "passing"
film, just as in all "passing" narratives, "passing" is only representable as the
desire to "pass." Because the representation of "passing" is dependent on the
spectatorial distance of a readership or viewership, the anonymity required by
the "passing" person remains a desideratum, structurally deferred by relation of
the "passing" narrative itself. However, when the "passing" narrative is sub-
mitted to the cinematic codes of film representation, its reliance on visible
Blackness as its epistemological guarantee, easily unmarked and elided in liter-
ary treatments, is forced to the surface. In order to see and thus know the
"passing" person, the audience must see Blackness.
Douglas Sirk's film, Imitation of Life' 56 has been the subject of extensive
contemporary criticism.I17 As one commentator has suggested, "the film's pre-
153. As part of her public performance of Blackness, Piper passes out cards to those whom she
believes have made anti-Black comments in her presence which read:
Dear Friend:
I am black.
I am sure that you did not realize this when you made/laughed at/agreed with that racist re-
mark. In the past I have attempted to alert white people to my racial identity in advance. Un-
fortunately, this invariably causes them to react to me as pushy, manipulative, or socially in-
appropriate. Therefore, my policy is to assume that white people do not make these remarks,
even when they believe there are no black people present, and to distribute this card when they
do.
I regret any discomfort my presence is causing you, just as I am sure you regret the dis-
comfort your racism is causing me.
Sincerely Yours,
Adrian Margaret Smith Piper
Tyler, supra note 30, at 215.
154. Id. at 220.
155. In writing this Article, I pondered what a film about "passing" would look like that included
no Black characters.
156. IMITATION OF LIFE (Universal Studios 1959).
157. See Valerie Smith, Reading the Intersection of Race and Gender in Narratives of Passing, 24
DIAcRrIcs 43-46 (1994) (commenting that Sirk's film has garnered more attention in contemporary
criticism than John Stahl's Imitation of Life (1934) because of its comparative stylistic sophistication);
see generally, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 62, at 167-86; IMITATION OF LIFE (Lucy Fischer ed., 1991)
(containing critical commentaries on the film, reviews, and the continuity script); Berlant, supra note 62,
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occupation with issues of artificiality makes it especially suitable for arguments
that explore the cultural construction and contestation of gender and race.' 58
As a remake of John Stahl's Imitation of Life'59 which itself was based on the
Harlem Renaissance novel of the same title by Fannie Hurst, Sirk's film con-
denses and revivifies many of the tropes and discursive ploys of the "passing"
narrative, even as it purports to unmask the artificiality of racial and gender hi-
erarchies. In Sirk's Imitation, like Pinky 6° and the earlier version by John
Stahl, Lost Boundaries,16 1 the popular portrayal of "passing" as imposture is
reiterated. However, Sirk's Imitation has attracted the special interest of white
feminist critics, not because of its reiteration of "passing" as imposture on the
brink of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, but because this reiteration
occurs within the context and conventions of the white woman's maternal
melodrama, which issued as a mechanism for exposing the vacuity of specifi-
cally female departures from the familial ideology of the white middle-class.
Thus, Sirk's Imitation is imitative in a double sense: it imitates through repeti-
tion (copy) as well as through the production of its own artificiality (counter-
feit).
In Sirk's version, the "passing" character is embodied by Susan Kohner, a
white actress who plays the role of Sarah Jane, the daughter of a visibly Black
woman, Annie Johnson. Annie volunteers to be the servant of the white actress
Lora Meredith (played by Lana Turner) who also has a daughter, Susie. This
embodiment of the "passing" character by a white actress is particularly sensi-
tive, as Mary Ann Doane observes, because "[t]here is one body too much.', 162
The spectator is confronted by the sight of "a white pretending to be a Black
pretending to be a white."' 63 But if we subtract the "Black pretending," the
Black who is in fact not there, we have instead a white pretending to be a
white, which is the situation that the character Sarah Jane finds herself in. Cu-
riously, one might even say perversely, the enforcement of Sarah Jane's Black-
ness is undertaken in the film, with the exception of one scene, not by any of
the white characters, but by the visibly Black character of her mother, Annie.
While Annie sets herself the task of returning Sarah Jane to the Black commu-
nity through a series of interventions that finally leads Sarah Jane to plead with
her mother, "If-by accident-we should ever pass in the street, please don't
recognize me.'164 Sirk, for his part, sets himself the project in the film of un-
at 110-40; Mary Ann Doane, Dark Continents: Epistemologies of Racial and Sexual Difference in Psy-
choanalysis and the Cinema, in FEMMES FATALES: FEMINISM, FILM THEORY, PSYCHOANALYSIS 209
(1991).
158. Smith, supra note 157, at 46.
159. IMITATION OF LIFE (Universal Studios 1934).
160. PINKY (20th Century Fox 1949).
161. LOST BOUNDARIES (Warner Studios 1949).
162. Doane, supra note 157, at 235.
163. Id.
164. IMITATION OF LIFE, supra note 157, at 140.
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masking Sarah Jane's "pretense" that she is not Black through the betrayal, not
of her mother or her race, but that of her own body.
It is indeed fascinating to watch how the white body, under the direction of
the master myth-maker, is made to betray its intrinsic Blackness, or more accu-
rately, how the invisible Black within the visible white is made visible. Invisi-
ble Blackness in Sirk's Imitation reveals its hidden truth in both subtle and
blatant ways. In one scene Sarah Jane dances in her bedroom over records
scattered across the floor in an exaggerated exhibition of Negro rhythm and
Black female wantonness. This is the racial logic of Sirk's Imitation: The fet-
ishized "blood" of the one drop rule, or what I have referred to as the Black
homunculus, must be made to dance, to perform itself into recognition.
In another scene Sarah Jane is asked to serve Lora Meredith who is meeting
with her agent and an Italian director in the living room. Sarah Jane mocks
Meredith by carrying the tray of food into the living room on her head and,
using the exaggerated accent of a French market fruit vendor, announces, "I
fetched you-all a mess o' crawdads."'' 65 When Lora asks her where she learned
this, Sarah Jane replies, "Ah l'amed it from my mammy... and she l'arned it
from Massa fo' she belonged to you.' 166 This dialogic marker of Sarah Jane's
Blackness, though it is motivated by the desire to mock those who would im-
pose Blackness on her by making her into a servant, actually naturalizes
Blackness as a figure of speech. The philosopher and feminist critic Judith
Butler suggests in her analysis of Nella Larsen's novel, Passing, that the pro-
tagonist, Clare Kendry, "passes not only because she is light-skinned, but be-
cause she refuses to introduce her blackness into conversation, and so with-
holds the conversational marker which would counter the hegemonic
presumption that she is white."167 Sirk's use of Blackness as a figure of speech
in Sarah Jane's performance, rather than exposing the artificiality of racial
stereotypes, buttresses the film's project of Samboifying Sarah Jane through
reification of Blackness as a conversational marker.
Blackening Sarah Jane is made even more difficult by the fact that her
identity is not at war with her subjectivity. In other words, she experiences no
internal conflict with her whiteness. This lack of an identity crisis creates a cri-
sis of representation that leads ultimately to violent reprisal. Since her raciali-
zation is often made to follow a parallel track as her sexualization, that reprisal
comes in the context of a sexual affair. When Sarah Jane's white boyfriend
discovers that her mother is Black, he beats her. With this assault, viewers
glimpse briefly for the last and only time in the film the sociopolitical dimen-
sion of segregated race relations implied by Sarah Jane's desire to "pass," and
thus nativize her whiteness. To be Black is to be the object of white violence
165. Id at 116.
166. Id.
167. See BUTLER, supra note 62, at 171.
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and revulsion unrestrained by deference to gender differences.
In the closing shot of the scene in question, Sarah Jane's white body,
slapped, beaten, and defeated, sinks into a black pool of water, a visual meta-
phor for the concession to the "lesson" she has just learned. The implicit threat
of further miscegenation, its invisibility making it all the more threatening and
potent, must be stopped with physical violence-violence itself being one of
the constitutive elements in the construction of Black subjectivity. With the ex-
ception of this scene in which Sarah Jane is made to share culpability with her
aLtacker, thematization of the sociopolitical dimension of the "passing" per-
son's dilemma is otherwise forestalled and submerged in the film's focus on
the family.
As can be safely argued, Sarah Jane not only sets the film's racial drama in
motion in her effort to nativize her whiteness, she more importantly carries the
burden of responsibility for all of the racial tensions negotiated by the film.
Because the film never delves explicitly into the question of why Sarah Jane is
motivated to "pass," thereby giving her actions social and political meaning,
she, in effect, remains racially "out of control" in the strangest of isolation.
Consequently, the social vexations she confronts are of her own creation. This
narrative extrication from the sphere of social interaction, constitutes a biolo-
gized remission to a position outside the public sphere. In this sense, her trans-
gression reads thematically (continuous with her mother, Annie) from the
nineteenth century text of slavery and its attendant problematic of unlicensed
Black freedom. Indeed, the plot intensification of the efforts to police and bring
back Sarah Jane each time she escaped into her whiteness makes of the film a
revamped fugitive slave narrative.
The discourse of slavery is established early in the film in the person of
Sarah Jane's mother Annie, who is the only visibly Black character in the film
that affects the articulation of Sarah Jane's "passing" dilemma. Annie makes
visible, via substitution and example, what is insufficiently seen in Sarah Jane:
her putative, legally mandated Blackness. Through this blood relation, Annie
serves the important function of articulating for the viewer an understanding of
the proper social position/status/function of the Blackness that Sarah Jane re-
fuses to occupy. The interminably stable Black identity evinced by Annie an-
chors viewers' comprehension of the quiddity or "whatness" and, crucially, the
"howness" of the Blackness defied by the evidence of Sarah Jane's white body.
Thus, Annie is made to serve in the film the same function in relation to Sarah
Jane as Margarita served in the courtroom in relation to Susie Phipps, that is, as
unimpeachable evidence of a white relative's Blackness. Indeed, Annie's
Blackness is constituted in terms of a blissful and ever-vigilant servitude, a
self-objectification as property under the sign of serviceability. In this sense,
the positiveness or certification of her Blackness, presented as her goodness,
her lovingness, her affection for "pretty things," remains understood in terms
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of an unproblematized accedence to the status of slave despite the historical
condition of post-Emancipation. As the only visible and self-contented Black
in the film, Annie becomes representative of a racial Blackness that is under-
stood in terms of her behavior, which the film presents as reducible to a flaw-
less serviceability.
Thus, it is no exaggeration to describe Annie as a metaphorical embodi-
ment of a Southern antebellum wish fulfillment: the contented slave, brimming
over with enthusiasm for her condition. Annie enters the film offering herself
for practically nonrenumerated employment to Lora Meredith, then an unem-
ployed aspiring actress, as:
A maid to live in? Someone to take care of your little girl? A strong healthy settled-
down woman who eats like a bird-and doesn't care if she gets no time off and will
work real cheap? ... Seems to me Miss Meredith, I'm just right for you. You
wouldn't have to pay no wages. Just let me come and do for you.'
68
Ostensibly a desperate response to a zero-sum situation (she and Sarah Jane
are apparently homeless) Annie's undeliberated enthusiasm (she doesn't even
haggle over board) smacks of self-satisfaction with her requested condition of
unrequited servility. Annie's solid embodiment of Blackness as a contented
servile condition enables the blonde ambition that the Lana Turner character,
according to her upscale bombshell aesthetic, epitomizes. In this respect, the
whiteness of Meredith is subtended by the spector of a replete Blackness em-
bodied in the figure of Annie.
Questions of property and its productive relations to the proper place of dif-
ferently racialized bodies undergird the thematic structure of the film. We are
made aware of this issue from the beginning as Sarah Jane's racial dilemma is
initiated. In the first scene to explore the incipient dynamic of family relations
within Meredith's household, Sarah Jane, d la Brown, 16 9 refuses the black doll
offered by Susie, and seizes the white one, disregarding Susie's stated unwill-
ingness to give it up. Meredith, recognizing the youthful innocence of the di-
lemma, begins to approach Sarah Jane with a smile that is interrupted by an
angry approaching Annie who chastises Sarah Jane for her lack of manners. As
Annie takes the white doll from her, Sarah Jane pleads that she doesn't want
the Black one, and begins to cry. In a closeup shot of her face regaining com-
posure, Sarah Jane drops the Black doll on the floor behind her.
In this succinct passage, we have an encapsulated textualization of the
film's symbolic racial and property relations. Guilt and innocence are negoti-
168. Id. at 46-47.
169. In Brown, the Supreme Court relied in part for its conclusion that segregation was unconstitu-
tional on social science data that was collected by Professor Kenneth Clark. See Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, n.1 1 (1954) (citing K. B. CLARK, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON
PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT (1950)). The Clark data was based on experiments in which Black chil-
dren were given white and Black dolls and asked to describe their reactions, which were generally
negative toward the Black dolls.
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ated across the white body of the doll, the figure of symbolic whiteness. Here
we witness a centering of whiteness as the object of the film's racial conten-
tion-at issue, who gets to possess or own it. This dynamic is deployed across
the bodies of the four female characters: Susie's innocence is established im-
mediately as she is the victim of the theft of whiteness; in this instant, the mo-
mentary snatching away of her whiteness takes on grave implications as she
indicates she's had it "all her life." Meredith is shielded from displaying
wrath-and thereby retains her innocence-by Annie's spirited intervention.
Moreover, at this key moment in the film, we witness the foregrounding of the
volatile nature of Annie's relationship to Sarah Jane that will continue for the
remainder of the film: the mother-daughter relationship is undermined, since,
from this moment on Annie will grant virtually all of her motherly physical af-
fection to Susie. Indeed, as the principal agent of the film's criminological in-
vestigation of Sarah Jane's crime of "passing," this Black mother-daughter re-
lationship is thematized as that of a policewoman/parole officer to a truant.
Significantly, with the exception of Sarah Jane's white boyfriend, Annie re-
mains throughout the film the sole admonisher of Sarah Jane; no other whites
ever chastise her for attempting to "pass."
It has been argued that Sarah Jane's self-development mimics-in a lower
class register-that of Lora Meredith. 170 After her failed and violently-ended
attempt at inhabiting her whiteness within the economy of heterosexual rela-
tions-she is beaten by her boyfriend-for the remainder of the film Sarah
Jane attempts to go native as first a saloon torch singer and then a dance hall
girl. Both efforts are readily understood as adulatory emulations of Lora's life
as public entertainer. But there is a crucial difference in the modality of their
public "enfleshment." As noted by many critics, Meredith's stardom, her pub-
lic embodiment, is celluloid, all glamour and lights, held out at arm's length, a
spectacle beheld from a distance.' 7 1 Despite the sleaziness of some of her ca-
reer tactics, the film allows Meredith to maintain the appearance of purity and
dignity threatened by the lures of her career trajectory-especially the kind of
unwanted advances from men that, if acceded to, would "spoil the gal" irrepa-
rably. By contrast, Sarah Jane's choice to inhabit the red light district as her
place of employment, along with the "in the flesh" nature of her work, makes
her choice unavoidably sleazy-whether singing on stage or rocking in the
dance line, you can reach out and touch her. There is no question of her profli-
gacy as it is brazenly constituted through her performance.
172
170. See Berlant, supra note 62, at 130; see also Doane, supra note 157, at 236.
171. See Berlant, supra note 62, at 136-37.
172. See Berlant, supra note 62, at 131 ("Sarah Jane's mode of self-instrumentality is to hyper-
emphasize her body in the present tense of performance ... by making herself a thing, she takes over
her own cultural objectification as a racialized subject, relying on male narcissism to separate her sexual
'value' from her juridical body."). The importance of this observation needs to be amended in relation to
the film's production of a racialized subjectivity that is not there within the enclosure of the visual id-
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Thus, the aloofiess of Meredith's celluloid celebrity stands in stark oppo-
sition to the fleshy proximity of Sarah Jane, and there is an implicit inversion
or exchange operative here: Sarah Jane makes visible the limit threshold of
Meredith's career trajectory. It is Sarah Jane, and the extrusion of her "Black-
ness" onto the stage, that makes apparent how far Meredith did not go, the
limit itself a point demaracting the proper(ty) and valuating line between
whiteness and Blackness, and even "woman."
One cannot underestimate the stake the film has in maintaining the sanctity
of Lora Meredith, despite the film's suspicion of commercialized, "imitative"
culture, and the consequent flagellation of her character. The enfolding of the
public issues of women's status and work roles within a patriarchal society into
the familial and personalizing confines of the melodramatic genre work to ob-
scure the significant process of racial (political, economic, cultural) valuation
performed by the film. Yet, in negotiating a critique of the patriarchal domina-
tion immanent in the film, much recent feminist criticism has overlooked the
racializing dimension of the construction of "woman" as subject, the schema of
normalization by which this gender category slips into whiteness, reified and
splayed back across the screen in the angelic glow of the star Lana Turner.
There is no question that Meredith's career success is made ambiguous by her
failings within the heterosexual familial matrix. She loses touch with her
daughter who falls in love with her love interest (and Susie's substitute father),
Steve, who is equally distressed in his relations with Meredith over her seem-
ing contempt for the borders of the patri-dominant household/lifestyle.
Here we get another glimpse at the process of defiming the proper gender
role of woman through the alembic of race. On the one hand, Sarah Jane's
"Blackness" performs the surrogate role of defining the transgressive limit of
whiteness in female terms. Her erotophilic spectralization is offered as a threat
inherent in Meredith's aberrant career "womanhood." On the other hand, and
from another perspective of domination, the retributive visitation of a potential
"incest" upon Meredith's household serves, in its definition as (against) nature,
to name the "unnatural" characteristic of Meredith's extra-familial behavior.
The crucial element is the age-old threat of Nature, here in the enfleshed form
of the "Black" woman, Sarah Jane. As an Ur-category of patriarchal discourse,
a threatening nature justifies the control-in the name of Nature's opposite,
Culture-of otherwise "out of control" female bodies-a condition latent in the
ioin. In each of these scenes, Sarah Jane is a white woman, and, because she is there, understood as
such. It is the desire constituted by the film-to see the "Blackness" of Sarah Jane-that motivates her
placement into a workplace that strategically demands/allows/begs for the white woman to make of her-
self a "nig." In this instance, the desire of male narcissism structures a self-allowance; the racialization
is merely a mode of gaining access to an otherwise "pure" social artifact: the unsullied white woman
exemplified by Lora Meredith. Within this particular scene, the value of the white woman Sarah Jane,
under this "erotico-contractualized" social relation, lies in her ability to be what she is not, viz. Black;
but from a critical vantage point, it is the film, through its contextualization of a set of white supremacist
discourse agreements, that makes this performance a representation of an underlying racial being.
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public embodiment of Lora Meredith. 173 With the exemplary signpost of Sarah
Jane on one side and a potentially disastrous incest on the other, the category of
"white woman," again, epitomized by Meredith, is subject to a process of
stablization. To step outside the bounds of proper white woman's behavior-
centered in the hetero-patriarchal home-threatens the sanctity of the category
with a verboten Blackness. In short, labor and independence are reworked
symbolically as a luring and disastrous Black womanhood. Thus, the fairytale
return of Meredith to the nuclear fold-a closure that rewrites Annie's funeral
scene at the end of the film as Meredith's wedding, an apotheosis of the white
heterosexual family-secures the sanctity of the white:woman dyad.
Just as Meredith represents a wholesale seizure (through the defining proc-
ess) of the category of whiteness (being morally, if not visually, what Sarah
Jane is not), her characterization amounts to an equal (if problematically ap-
prehended) subsumption of the category of woman. It is not that Sarah Jane
and Annie become not-Woman in some totalizing sense, but perhaps, "awo-
man," in relation to this unequal distribution within the process of
(en)gendering. The mutual substantiating that occurs through the embattled
pairing of "woman" with "whiteness" creates a kind of moral and racial pro-
hibitory structure-the "white woman." At the same time, the alpha privative
"Black (a)woman" defines that which is to be excluded or prohibited.
This uneven opposition precludes or makes substantially suspicious a criti-
cal strategy that arrogates the gender status of "woman" to an undifferentiated
category of oppression. 174 The engendered privilege of white woman (compre-
hended now through the overwriting masculinist terms of Culture and Soci-
ety--career success, cash and property, respectability), in contrast with the ab-
jection of Black woman (an outgrowth of an uncivilized, uncultured, and
domestic(ated) Nature), is herewith overwritten by a panoply of entitlements
with crucial determining effects upon both the gender and racial categories. To
put this in the crudest material terms, the white woman, Meredith, has a suc-
cessful career, makes the money, purchases the property, and sends her
daughter to college, all accoutrements of the masculine public sphere, and
keeps her scruples and gets the man, both of which result in her gendered nor-
malization. In stark, almost brutal opposition, the Black woman, Annie, dies
with a broken heart riven by an unarticulated political invasion into her already
173. See Patricia Cooper, "A Masculinist Vision of Useful Labor": Popular Ideologies About
Women and Work in the United States, 1820 to 1939, 84 Ky. L.J. 827, 837 (1995-96) (explaining that,
as early the nineteenth century, "[w]hites displayed considerable anxiety about black women who chose
to stay home, rather than work, and decried 'female loaferism' at the same time that white women's do-
mesticity was encouraged and celebrated").
174. See Harris, supra note 39, at 587-90; see also LEWIS R. GORDON, BAD FAITH AND
ANTIBLACK RACISM 124-129 (1995) (discussing the misogynistic dimension of anti-black racism and
the ambivalent deployment of the white woman in a variety of social and discursive structures). See
generally Ruth Frankenberg, WwITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERs: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
WHITENESS (1993).
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fragile family structure. And the white woman of known African ancestry,
Sarah Jane, collapses with her life strategy foiled and corrupted, at least for the
moment.
Lauren Berlant is certainly correct in arguing that
once the women have leisure and security [although it is not clear in the film how
these two accomplishments pan out in the lives of Annie and Sarah Jane], their
bodies reemerge as obstacles, sites of pain and signs of hierarchy: the white daugh-
ter falls in love with her mother's love object [and the death of Annie]; the light-
skinned African-American daughter wants to pass for white, and so disowns her
dark-skinned mother, whose death from heartbreak effectively and melodramati-
cally signals the end of this experiment in a female refunctioning of the national
public sphere.
175
But it is clear that because of their relatively diametric material conditions,
Lora Meredith is not Annie Johnson. And where both figures are engaged tex-
tually in the elaboration of what Berlant calls a "nationalist politics of the
body,"' 176 it is ultimately race, not gender, that effectively draws the line of in-
clusivity within the borders of the "nation." This is accomplished through the
film's scopic reinvestment of a fetishizing transit running between real prop-
erty and the scintillating bodily surfaces of Meredith. The accession of Mere-
dith to her property (the fame, the fortune, and Annie) is legitimated by Sirk's
lush and magisterial long shots of interiors and by the close up shots framing
the glowing pearlescence of her ever-composed visage. And while this acces-
sion may have been troubled (by the Susie problem) with the intervention of a
patriarchal imaginary that disallowed a successful and male-excluding matriar-
chal independence to go unpunished, the denouement of her relationship to
Steve details the inclusion of the white woman into the nation framework, of
course within the confining protocols of the hetero-nuclear family matrix.
The effective misogyny of this imaginary's work through the body of
Meredith is undeniable: the white woman has obviously been made to sacrifice
some degree of independence in determining the status of that inclusion. Yet,
the structuring of her character as a representative inclusion/exclusion mecha-
nism along the axes of race and gender underscores the multi-valenced dimen-
sion of the patriarchal project, its ability to split social subjects in caste-like
ways.
Finally, an adequate investigation of the production of white racial subjec-
tivity in Sirk's Imitation must address the constitutive alibi of colorblind racial
innocence that finds its characterological embodiment in the astounding com-
munity of white racial "innocents" populating the film. It is this innocence that
makes the tragedy of the film so ironic, so unbelievable. While white segrega-
tion from and discrimination of Blacks formulate the substance of the politics




of "passing," in Sirk's Imitation, whites bear no agency in relation to these re-
spective practices. Indeed the incriminating substance of these practices seems
to hover like some miasma over the social realm, disembodied from the speci-
ficities of racialized social, political, economic, residential, and employment
practices. Astoundingly, there is throughout the film no express interest in the
maintenance of the racial color line by any of the whites.
Three consecutive scenes exemplify this production of white subjectivity as
a constitutive racial innocence, exonerating the whites from responsibility for
the racial histrionics otherwise understood as Sarah Jane's personal problem. In
the first scene, Annie has arrived at the public school and entered Sarah Jane's
classroom to give her a package. The white teacher informs her "I don't have
any little colored girl in my class."' 77 Annie spots Sarah Jane, approaches her,
and upon being addressed, Sarah Jane, bursting into tears, runs out of the class-
room. As Annie pursues her, the teacher tells her, "we didn't know." 17 This
appeal to ignorance is the first positioning of the white subject as innocent by-
stander to the "passer's" thusly personally cohesive transgression of the racial
order, one that we should begin to suspect floats unhinged to any human
agency.
Later, when the older Sarah Jane is tracked down by her mother in bar-
room, as she leaves, the white man munnurs, "your mother[?] Well I'll be..
179 Just as the befuddled glance of the white woman enacts a refusal to inter-
rogate the racial fixity of the "we" that "did not know," the uttered fascination
of the white man repeats this claim to innocence. Yet this lack of knowledge
shared within the white community of the film finds its corollary imperative in
Annie's astounding ventriloquization of the segregationist racial order that for
the whites must remain unknown and unspoken.
This is made clear in the next sequence outside the school. Amid snowfall,
Sarah Jane cries, "Why should I tell them, they didn't ask me!" to which Annie
replies, "because that's what you are and it's nothin' to be ashamed of." Sarah
Jane pleads, "why do you have to be my mother? Why?" and runs off.180 The
black mother/daughter relationship is renamed according to a displacement of a
politico-racial dilemma-white segregation policies-to an outgrowth of dis-
course within the familial fold. Annie can give no meaningful words to her
love and care for Sarah Jane, for to do so would reveal the culpability of white
discourses/structures that seek to harm for the transgressions of her daughter.
Sarah Jane, driven by a representational strategy that makes her transgressions
a personal matter of bad (mixed) blood-a "Black" out of control--can only
articulate her objections as far as her personal being extends socially-the pro-
177. IMITATION OF LIFE, supra note 157, at 73.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 132.
180. Id at 75.
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hibitive blood embodied in the visible Blackness of her mother. Crucially,
neither can perform a political reading of their situation. Indeed Sarah Jane,
like her mother, pronounces the alibi of white innocence in revealing that the
whites never asked of her race, implying that they could care less.
Throughout the remainder of the film, it will be Annie who enforces the ra-
cial line, demanding that Sarah Jane "return" the property (whiteness) she has
stolen. In a deft closure, the film seals both culpability and censure within the
Black family. In doing so, it makes the political choice of presenting the de-
struction of this family unit as a necessary component of a white subject-
constituting strategy in the form of an exonerating ignorance that conceals the
agent of its destruction.
In the next scene back at Meredith's apartment, in the complaining tones of
a subordinate to a superior, Annie informs Meredith that Sarah Jane is "pass-
ing" at school, and to ensure both Meredith and the viewer understand what
"passing" is, tells us, "pretending she's white." In the same shot, the camera
focuses upon Sarah Jane as she turns to Meredith in a closeup that bifurcates
her scowling face in a chiaroscuro that serves as a visual contradiction of the
claim she growls, "but I am white, I'm as white as Susie." Meredith, searching
for a way out of her confusion, reaches for Sarah Jane and tells her, "Honey
don't you see, it doesn't make any difference to us because we all love you. I'll
take you back to school myself." Outraged, Sarah Jane yells, "I'm never going
back to that school, never, as long as I live," and runs out of the room. In the
remaining seconds of this scene, we witness the extent to which the film mysti-
fies racial politics. The dialogue unfolds as follows:
Meredith: Annie don't be upset. Children are always pretending. You know that.
Annie: No. It's a sin to be ashamed of what you are. And it's even worse to pretend,
to lie. Sarah Jane has to learn that the lord must have had his reasons for making
some of us white and some of us black.
Meredith: Don't worry Annie, I'm sure you'll be able to explain things to her.
Annie, shaking her head: I don't know, how do you explain to your child she was
born to be hurt.
18 1
Sarah Jane's "dilemma" can find no consolation in political analysis.
Rather, as a product of providential design, her antics are not only the pretenses
of a child, but a sin. The whites, represented here by Meredith, whose anxiety
serves as the fundamental origin of the "passing" problematic, are oblivious to
its operations-they can voice no explanation. Yet Annie too is confined
within the limits of the naturalizing discourses of God and Nature. A funda-
mentally masochistic venture, her interpretation is also an auto-critique as her
history/experience/circumstance sustains no interpretation of the harm that
181. Id. at 76-77.
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both she and Sarah Jane suffer. There is no racist text, no history of domina-
tion, no circumstantial subjugation; there is only the Black body stricken with
self-lament.
Given the necessary production of white innocence for the realization of a
"post-racial" liberal politic, it is only logical that the text of white supremacy
and its retrospective defense of the color line be given voice in the form of the
undeniably Black body. Like Plessy's African ancestors and Phipp's Margarita,
Annie's body and voice enact the trans-historical Blackness that snags (thereby
making visible) the white body intent on "passing" into invisibility. For it is
Annie, the stalwart Black homunculus revivified, who brings calm to the sub-
merged agony of the film's criminoligical investigation: how to locate the
"Black" white, circulating within the segregated social realm, without anchor-
ing the search to a measurable white guilt or accountability.
Thus we are left to imagine that somewhere off screen, Sarah Jane's desire
to nativize her whiteness developed according to some element of social logic.
But who took Sarah Jane to school? How did she occupy a seat in the class-
room without the administration knowing that her mother was Black? If her
partial African ancestry were known, would she be allowed in the classroom -
no Black children were present? (Were there any Blacks in the school at all?)
Perhaps criticism of the film's refusal to articulate an origin of Sarah Jane's de-
sire to inhabit her whiteness is unreasonable; after all, a film cannot cover all
ground. Yet it is these explanatory absences, often bordering on the absurd,
that sustain the development of the tale of Sarah Jane's racial "crime."
Without the conveyance of determinate action into a position outside the
filmic production of knowledge, the questions of racializing origins, politics,
and strategies suffer a critical blanching. This same outside space of spectator-
ship and social interactions functions in part to reinvest white discourse agree-
ments: "miscegenated" Blackness remains "Black" (the one drop rule) despite
the evidence of the visual idiom. This racial order that prevails in popular con-
sciousness and in law exists in excess of individual white culpability for that
order, just as it had in Green. However, it exercises and establishes its limit
upon the subject as it transgresses its boundaries.
Yet this exercise must be understood as the fictive play of the Black ho-
munculus lodged at the center of this discourse, a fiction that was destined to
come to an end, because Sarah Jane and the "subject" she represents, like Susie
Phipps, Anatole Broyard, and countless others before them, escaped into her
whiteness. With the turn to colorblind ideology in contemporary politics pres-
aged by the film's enactment of white innocence of and the death of her
mother, the Black homunculus was left for dead. The mandate of antisubordi-
nation resistance politics, as well as that of an antiessentialism critique, is that
it should be demystified and rejected, rather than revived.
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IV. CURRENT MOVEMENTS AND THE REVIVIFICATION OF "PASSING"
DISCOURSE
Colorblindness and multiracialism purport to be discourses of racial tran-
scendence. In the case of colorblindness, the basic oppressive dynamic of white
supremacy is to be overcome by treating race as an irrelevant natural fact and
ignoring it. Multiracialism shares a similar outlook that race is irrelevant, but
rather than ignore it, pursues a strategy of multiplying the categories of racial
difference to promote the irrelevance of all racial categories. The following ar-
guments attempt to show that both colorblindness and multiracialism fail in
their attempt to overcome the basic oppressive dynamic of white supremacy.
A. A Critique of the Turn to Colorblind Constitutionalism
But that is not all: there is a great chasm fixed between us; no one from our side
who wants to reach you can cross it, and none may pass from your side to us.
Luke 16:26 (from the parable of Lazarus)
It is with the precautions in mind with which this inquiry began that I ex-
amine the colorblind thesis. In his Plessy dissent, Justice Harlan formulated the
constitutional principle of colorblindness as a moral and policy response to the
racial social system. The Plessy majority disagreed that separation on the basis
of race was "wholly inconsistent with... civil freedom and ... equality before
the law."'182 Harlan's vision was that "our Constitution is colorblind.' 8 In the
particular circumstances of the case, a colorblind Constitution would have
meant that the question of Homer Plessy's race-not color-could be avoided
just as effectively as it was avoided by the meretricious arguments of the ma-
jority. Harlan's colorblind counterpoint to the majority's "separate but equal"
argument makes the Court's evasion of Plessy's claim to whiteness key to both
his victory and his defeat. The profundity of this evasion (which will be un-
packed momentarily) should not distract us from the point that Harlan's vision,
like King's dream, was much more jeremiad than restatement of law. It was a
moral response to the continuing crisis of abuse, turned acute, of the Black
body. 1
84
182. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 559.
184. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), grew out one of the bloodiest massacres in
Louisiana history. The Supreme Court held that the criminal conspiracy section of the Enforcement Act
of 1870 was inapplicable to the lynching of two Blacks because no national rights had been violated and
that in order to invoke due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment state action was required.
A similar result was reached in United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882), with respect to the crimi-
nal conspiracy sections of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871. The Court held that Congress lacked the
power to punish members of a lynch mob who had seized prisoners held by a state deputy sheriff be-
cause the Fourteenth Amendment did not reach purely private conduct. These decisions had the effect of
declaring open season on the lynching of Blacks from a federal enforcement standpoint since the states
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The colorblind critique most often seeks the moral high ground of human-
ism by denying the coherence of race. Dissatisfied, however, with demonstra-
tions of incoherence, the critique moves on to further assert the lack of rele-
vance of race. Once relevance is shown to be lacking, the critique concludes
with arguments purporting to show the unfairness of racial classification. All
along the way, principled resistant reading of colorblind criticism is forced to
disaggregate the various ways in which Black bodies and voices are used either
a) to teach whites a lesson, or b) to make whites feel more comfortable, or c) to
reveal dissension among Blacks in order to install the white-favored version of
a Black view.
Color, according to the advocates of colorblindness, is a natural fact about
human beings that 1) no one chooses, 2) no one can change, and therefore 3)
should not be given a positive or negative value (nor even noticed) in our
dealings with one another. As such, colorblindness expresses a millenarian
ideal in a society vexed by color discrimination. 185 Professor Boxill, however,
has already effectively shown that, assuming the validity of 1 and 2, 3 does not
follow. His point is that since "it may be perfectly just to discriminate between
persons on the basis of distinctions they are not responsible for having," the so-
called "responsibility criterion" cannot account for the injustice of racial dis-
crimination.' 6 On the basis of our analysis, however, we cannot join Boxill in
simply conceding the validity of 1 and 2.
Quite to the contrary, color as an index of the racial condition of the indi-
vidual can be rejected, and the coercion of the visual idiom resisted. In fact,
such resistance was typical of the nineteenth century slavocracy for which, it
was hardly necessary to say, a slave could not be a white man. True, color is
not chosen (nor changed) in the same sense that one choses or changes one's
mind about a meal or even a hairstyle.' 87 Color as an index of racial condition,
it should be understood, is not simply color, but a system of valuation of color.
Indeed, the first evaluative step of colorblindness is its acquiescence in and
(often enough) advocacy of color as an adequate index of racial condition.
Again, the anteriority of race to racial discourse emerges. For the "passing"
person, that is to say, for whiteness, colorblindness nullifies by fiat the effec-
tivity of the Blackness within. Consigned to irrelevance, it is the Black homun-
could not be relied on to protect Blacks from white violence or to convict whites who committed such
violence. See also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments do not give Congress the power to prohibit private discrimination in public accommoda-
tions).
185. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520-529 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring).
186. BOXILL, supra note 62, at 15.
187. One of the criticisms that has been made of the popular singer Michael Jackson is that be-
tween the release of his albums Offthe Wall and Thriller, he surgically altered his appearance to make
himself look more like a white person. See MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, REFLECTING BLACK: AFRICAN-
AMERICAN CULTURAL CRITICISM 47-48 (1993).
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culus that is left for dead without ever undergoing the scrutiny that would ex-
pose its entrenchment in the imperatives of white racial discourse.
What makes this consignment profound, however, is not merely what gets
trashed, but rather what is retained. In contrast to the interiorization of white-
ness performed by the nineteenth century jurist, which was itself, as we have
seen, a kind of colorblindness, the colorblind principle invokes a vestibular ac-
cession to surfaces, within which whiteness survives, this time as a purportedly
irrelevant, but nevertheless newly indefeasible property claim grounded in the
visual order. In terms of Plessy's rejected plea, lately valorized in the color-
blind principle, whiteness is now property that cannot be taken away without
due process of law, and property whose legitimacy cannot even be questioned
by the state. Racial blood, as it turns out, was only skin deep. For the "passing"
person, the vestibular quality of this accession appends to its moral enablement
of a passionate detachment to a racial superstructure on which the door is
firmly closed, but to which the colorblind cloakroom is permanently stuck.
The moral dilemmas, therefore, historically given to the "passing" person
as racial trespasser, with colorblindness, have, so to speak, passed out of his-
tory. What were those dilemmas? Were there not suspicions of illegitimacy
(because miscegenation was illegal) that could only be alleviated by acknowl-
edging subterfuge? And didn't charges of inauthenticity also have to be made
for adopting the project of being simply white with guilty knowledge of an Af-
rican-descended ancestor? And worse, because whiteness was pure, was not
"passing" the most complete and intimate betrayal of not only the family, but
society and the state as well? Was "passing" not a false claim to legal person-
ality and social innocence in the face of undeniable yet perilous obligation: the
sui generis affinity based on the bonds of kinship? But that is not all. Did these
dilemmas not pertain to a great chasm fixed between us wherein no one from
our side who wants to reach you can cross it, and none may pass from your
side to us?
The turn to colorblindness has dissolved these moral dilemmas in the fash-
ion of a closing door. Believing that nothing on the other side bears any im-
portance to those of us here in the ahistorical present, that those left there were
left for dead, our moral situation, in opposition to the circle of understanding,
takes on the character of a willed linearity according to which every discursive
revivification of racial valuation pops up like a surprise, elicits sympathetic re-
sponses (among the best) and reflexive dismissal as singularly odd.
Despite its moral intonations, then, the very formula by which we derive
the colorblind principle-a natural fact that no one chooses, no one can
change-can be seen to be methodologically enchanted by extant social forms.
Where the moral dilemmas of the "passing" person as racial trespasser were
lived and real, but based on white supremacist assumptions and practices, col-
orblindness substitutes the reassuring tactic of willed innocence. Without real
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resolution, however, that is, without abrogation of the discourse agreements of
white authority, this tactic tends to perpetuate the characteristic evasion of ra-
cial discourse, the evasion of the sociopolitical meaning of the claim to white-
ness. 188
To be sure, it is a compelling goal of Critical Race Theory to develop an
emancipatory perspective, one which takes account of our historical situation
and is oriented towards an ethical form of life. From the start, it was clear that
such a task demanded massive material reconstruction along the fault lines of
the normatively excluded. The role of legal discourse in this project cannot be
restricted to purely formal adjustments inherent in Harlan's received concep-
tion of a colorblind Constitution. Indeed, the colorblind thesis, as the fate of the
moral dilemmas of the "passing" person reveals, only begs the question of ra-
cial categorization. The damage is manifold. For not only is whiteness made
secure, its right to exclude vulcanized, and its authority and value given unim-
peachable privilege, but the exploration of Blackness, as a category of emanci-
patory interest, rather than biological or genealogical destiny, is indefinitely
deferred.
B. Multiracialism After Identity: A Critique of the Return to Vulgar
Essentialism
The social dimension of race is illuminated by terms such as quadroon, octoroon,
or mestizo which attempt to make distinct from whites those individuals with identi-
cal physical appearances but fractions of speciously documentable nonwhite blood
These terms illustrate that, as a means of human classification, race can ignore
shared physical resemblance and categorize on the basis of assigned social legacy.
-Valerie Babb
189
Some of the most strident critics of racial classification are an elite group of
white women who have become the mothers of Black mixed-race children.
190
188. See generally HANEY L6PEz, supra note 20 (discussing the assumption of whiteness as non-
raced.
189. BABB, supra note 89, at 10.
190. See Review of Federal Measurements of Race and Ethnicity: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service 103d
Cong. 119 (1993) [hereinafter Multiracial Hearings] (wherein Project RACE President Susan Graham
testified that her children have three histories: "They have their father's history, their mother's history,
and they have a multiracial history, too, and they do identify with other multiracial people."); see also
JANE LAZARRE, BEYOND THE WHITENESS OF WHITENESS: MEMOIR OF A WHITE MOTHER OF BLACK
SONS 67, 79 (1996) (recognizing the desire of white parents to protect their Black children from the ef-
fects that the children's appearance have upon racist persons in society); REDDY, supra note 30, at ix
(expressing concern that others will find her Black son racially threatening and thereby presume him to
be a criminal); Carol R. Goforth, "What is She": How Race Matters and Why It Shouldn't, 46 DEPAUL
L. REV. 1, 107-08 (1996) (concluding, upon analysis of the multiracial census movement, that racial
classifications should be abolished); cf Lewis R. Gordon, Specificities: Cultures ofAmerican Identity-
Critical 'Mixed Race'?, 1 SOC. IDENTITIES 381, 382 (1995) (observing that the focus of the multracial
movement is upon the presumed classification needs of Black biracial persons); Kenneth E. Payson,
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They do not want their children to suffer the pain of racism. For this reason,
they have become very sensitive to the subject of race and have entered racial
discourse in order to dismantle or deconstruct it. 19' They complain that strang-
ers ask about the racial identity of their typically mixed-race children. 192 They
fret over census forms and college applications that inquire into their children's
racial status. 193 They balk at the suggestion that their own racial status might be
a detriment to their children's adjustment to a society in which race still mat-
ters. 194 They invent and defend new terms like biracial and multiracial to de-
flect any implication that their children's Black ancestry or dark complexions
should determine their racial identity. 95 Quite simply, they advocate accep-
tance of the multiracial category on the one hand, and on the other oppose the
use of racial labels, 196 as a means to improve the quality of their own familial
relationships and their own sense of interracial harmony. This form of opposi-
tion is avowedly individualistic in its outlook and upholds colorblindness. 1
97
Check One Box: Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the Classification of Mixed-Race People, 84 CAL.
L. REV. 1233, 1235-36 (1996) ("Those advocating [a multiracial category] are largely multiracial per-
sons, parents in interracial unions who advocate on behalf of their mixed-race children..."). Project
RACE (Reclassify All Children Equally), along with another powerful advocacy group, the American
Association of Multi-Ethnic Americans (AMEA), has as one of its stated goals the inclusion of a "multi-
racial" classification on all state and federal forms that request racial identification, with a special focus
on gaining recognition in the United States census.
191. The philosopher Naomi Zack, who is herself a mixed-race person of partial African ancestry,
has said that "[t]o attempt to create a racial identity of mixed race, based on the history of mixed race in
the United States, would involve not only many intensely deconstructive dialogues with past texts but
positive reconstructions and constructions in racial theory and practice." NAOMI ZACK, RACE AND
MIXED RACE 144 (1993).
192. See Goforth, supra note 190, at 107-08. But cf JON MICHAEL SPENCER, THE NEW COLORED
PEOPLE: THE MIXED-RACE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 59, 60 (1997) (reporting the reaction of one mixed-
race Black woman to Susan Graham's Project RACE: "It is not coincidental that the woman spearhead-
ing a movement for a 'multiracial' category is white ... What's so bad about being just Black?... If
society had defined Susan Graham's children as White she would not be fighting for a 'multiracial'
category. Project RACE? More like Project RACIST!").
193. See SPENCER, supra note 192, at 60.
194. See id.
195. Some supporters of the multiracial category have defined 'multiracial' in such a way that only
interracial parentage, rather than mixed ancestry, can produce a multiracial or biracial individual. See
Candace Mills, "Multiracial": Worth Fighting For?, INTERRACE, Nov. 1993, at 25. One impact of this
narrow definition is to provide the children of interracial couples a 'multiracial' escape hatch from iden-
tification with subordinated minority groups, while closing the 'multiracial' door on the majority of
Black Americans who are in fact of mixed ancestry. See SPENCER, supra note 192, at 70 (estimating that
70 % of the Black community has a multigenerational lineage that is multiracial).
196. Responding to a proposal that would offer a multiracial box followed by the additional ques-
tion of the respondent's component racial ancestry, Susan Graham of Project RACE stated that it would
be "an invasion of privacy with no justification" to have mixed-race people mark the component catego-
ries of their racial ancestry. Multiracial Hearings, supra note 190, at 120. Based on that response, we
can surmise that she would be unsatisfied with the adoption by the Office of Management and Budget
[hereinafter OMB] of a proposal that would permit persons of multiple racial ancestry to check all racial
classifications that apply on federal forms. See Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Fed-
eral Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58,782, 58,788-90 (1997) [hereinafter Revisions to Di-
rective No. 15]. See also Barbara Vobejda, Census Expands Options for Multiracial Families, WASH.
POST, Oct. 30, 1997, at AI I (quoting Susan Graham of Project RACE complaining that "OMB is trying
to erase 'multiracial' from the vocabulary").
197. See Goforth, supra note 190, at 104.
Vol. 18:297, 2000
"Passing" Revisited
It is believed by supporters of the multiracial category that the middle cate-
gory illuminates the binarisms of race.' 98 It is even asserted that by occupying
the middle multiracial individuals "possess unique credentials for mediating
racial conflict." 199 This same author who believes that multiracials are natural
mediators of racial conflict opines that the multiracial's ability to "pass" from
minority (read Black) to majority (read white), without detection, is an asset in
interracial conflict mediation.20 0 One must suppose, along with Valerie Babb,
that interracial conflict mediation is part of the assigned social legacy of the
multiracial as "passer," regardless of how these persons choose to "identify."20'
More pointedly, the multiracial "passer," regardless of how she chooses to
identify, is assumed, contrary to the position advanced in this Article, to "pass"
whenever she fails to reveal mixed parentage or ancestry. But so-called mis-
taken identity encounters can occur only when the person under racial scrutiny
has already failed the eyeball test of racial recognition, which is the ideological
origin and anchor of racial classifications ab initio. Failing the eyeball test for
Blackness, yet being reinscribed as Black, requires reassertion of the one drop
rule and the discourse agreements of white authority. Thus, multiracial dis-
course, in addition to essentializing racial identities and capacities, 2°2 revives
the discourse agreements of white authority by combining "passing" rhetoric
with the myth of mulatto exceptionalism.
20 3
In the biracial worldview blacks and whites are monoracial. 204 Those who
are monoracial are the material, the stuff, out of which the biracial or multira-
cial gets made. What the multiracial requires of the monoracial is that the cate-
gories by which the monoracial are defined remain fixed in space and time in
order that the multiracial may elide or even transcend the binarism and unidi-
mensionality of monoracialism. Being both Black and white, the biracial sub-
ject is free to be neither Black nor white. The freedom to be neither because
198. Although the focus here is avowedly on the Black/white binarism, this Article assumes that
for the multiracial category movement all interracial offspring constitute a middle category. See Bijan
Gilanshah, Multiracial Minorities: Erasing the Color Line, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 183, 190 n.34 (1993)
(asserting that multiracial persons have three identity choices: to identify with maternal racial heritage,
paternal racial heritage, or assimilate both "by developing a 'fluid' third identity").
199. Id. at 198.
200. Id. at 198 n.80.
201. See generally Gilanshah, supra note 198 (asserting that multiracials have racial identity
"choices").
202. Cf Harris, supra note 39, at 581-616 (defming gender essentialism as the notion that there is a
monolithic "women's experience" that can be described independent of race, class, and sexual orienta-
tion).
203. On the myth of mulatto exceptionalism, see E.B. Reuter, The Superiority of the Mulatto, 23
AM. J. Soc. 83, 83 and passim (1917) (arguing that the American mulatto is superior to "Negroes of
pure blood"); see also SPENCER, supra note 192, at 81-84 (complaining that multiracial category advo-
cates are appropriating prominent mixed-race Black historical figures and celebrities and reclassifying
them as multiracial).
204. See Itabari Njeri, Sushi and Grits: Ethnic Identity and Conflict in a Newly Multicultural
America, in LURE AND LOATHING: ESSAYS ON RACE, IDENTITY AND THE AMBIVALENCE OF
ASSIMILATION 13, 24-25 (Gerald Early ed., 1993).
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one is both is a freedom to be position of privilege whose effectiveness is not
possible without the cooperation of the monoracial in the assessment of them-
selves as both racial and unidimensional. On the other hand, what monoracial-
ism requires of the multiracial is suppression of a kind of truth, a racial truth,
the truth of consanguinity, of mixture, of human multiplicity. On the one hand,
multiracialism rejects the one-drop rule of Black hypodescent in order, on the
other hand, to generalize this rule to all racial categories: one drop of any
mixed blood is sufficient to reproduce the multiracial in all its multiplicity of
racial extraction, irrespective of phenotype. It is, of course, not to be over-
looked the way in which monoracial rejection of what may be called the multi-
racial thesis also appears to replicate a basic oppressive dynamic of the "pass-
ing" narrative, a dynamic in which the "passing" person must deny the "truth"
of who she is. It will be helpful to consider what is believed to be at stake in
the recognition of the multiracial subject.
Part of the problem is that, in defining who qualifies as multiracial,20 5 mul-
tiracial category advocates rely on the disreputable nineteenth-century notion
of racial blood or biological race for which the one-drop rule has been roundly
criticized. Part of the problem is that in criticizing the multiracial category
movement's concept of race as biology, opponents of the multiracial category
movement either fail to articulate their own concept of race, or similarly rely
on the disreputable nineteenth century notion of racial blood. The latter prob-
lem points in the direction of what may be a more general lapse in Critical
Race Theory to suggest and defend a concept of race that could coherently re-
place biological race and yet remain faithful to everyday racial experience. 206
Part of the problem is the theoretical assumption that race is a feature of expe-
rience over which individuals equally exercise choice, and at the same time,
are sociopolitically, if not biologically, compelled to acknowledge.
This Article suggests that race, as it has come to be used in American law
and society, is composed of both identity claims and subjective experience.
This much can be acknowledged without essentializing race or even allowing
that it is something real. What is real is that none can escape the construction
of the self subjectively as a particular type of racial being. Most often identity
205. See Gilanshah, supra note 198, at 183 n.2 (defining biracial as "someone with two socially
and phenotypically distinct racial heritages-one from each parent" and defining multiracial as "the bi-
racial person and persons synthesizing two or more diverse [racial] heritages") (quoting Maria P.P.
Root, Within, Between, and Beyond Race, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 3 n. 1 (1992)).
206. See Haney L6pez, supra note 39, at 5 (noting that critical race theorists "argue for race con-
sciousness, yet do so without explicitly suggesting what race might be"). After making this criticism of
Critical Race Theory, Haney L6pez does no better in his own definitional approach to race. Like Gilan-
shah, Haney L6pez places too much emphasis on the racial identity choices that some, like himself,
make to the detriment of recognizing race as part of an assigned social legacy that for others permits no
such choice. DuBois does better when he suggests that a Black person is "a person who must ride 'Jim
Crow' in Georgia," even though that system of segregation as a benchmark for racial recognition has




will coincide with the subjective construction of the self as a particular type of
racial being, but sometimes identity claims will place one at variance with
subjective experience. In the event that there is dissonance between racial sub-
jectivity and racial identity, it is the latter over which individuals may exercise
agency and choice. By contrast, racial subjectivity remains an unsuitable site
for transcendence. Its durability is guaranteed by the body and the accumula-
tion of historical meaning and ideological investment that surrounds its mode
of appearance in the context of first-time encounters.
Thus, rejection of the multiracial thesis may be premised on refusal to ac-
cede to the discourse agreements of white authority, and recognition that the
mere multiplication of racial categories does nothing to increase the emanci-
patory possibilities of those who, based on their bodies alone, will be discrimi-
nated against as Blacks.
CONCLUSION
This idea you have of making a Negro out of yourself is nothing more than a senti-
ment; you do not realize the fearful import of what you intend to do... . I can
imagine no more dissatisfied human being than an educated, cultured, and refined
coloured man in the United States.
-James Weldon Johnson
20 7
Colorblindness and multiracialism purport to be discourses of racial tran-
scendence. In the case of colorblindness, the basic oppressive dynamic initiated
by white supremacy is to be overcome by treating race as an irrelevant natural
fact and ignoring it and the relevance society has given it. Multiracialism
shares a similar outlook that race is irrelevant, but rather than ignore it, pursues
a strategy of multiplying the categories of racial difference in order to promote
the irrelevance of all racial categories. The preceding arguments have at-
tempted to show that both colorblindness and multiracialism fail in their at-
tempt to overcome the basic oppressive dynamic of white supremacy.
Colorblindness fails by not taking into account social divisions and hierar-
chies based on race sedimented in American culture over the years through the
treatment of race as biological concept and acceptance of the notion of racial
blood. To the extent that race is not reducible to color, colorblindness falsely
equates race consciousness with consciousness of color. Moreover, in its quest
for transcendence colorblindness elides rather than confronts the mystifications
embedded in white race consciousness. In the discourse of "passing" this eli-
sion translates into a refusal to acknowledge the subjective experience of those
whose partial African ancestry makes their claim to whiteness questionable.
Thus, white race consciousness, under a regime of colorblindness, can maintain
207. JOHNSON, supra note 136, at 145.
Yale Law & Policy Review
its claim to racial purity and innocence, while' avoiding the sociopolitical
meaning of the claim to whiteness.
Multiracialism fails as a discourse of racial transcendence both because it
adopts a colorblind perspective on race and because it combines "passing"
rhetoric with the myth of mulatto exceptionalism. Multiracialism both essen-
tializes and biologizes racial categories, ignoring the important distinction that
this Article has attempted to draw between subjectivity and identity. Thus, the
multiracial category movement is fairly charged with attempting to create for
the children of white/minority interracial couples a multiracial escape hatch
from identification with subordinated minority groups, as well as a racial
buffer class that will enjoy fewer privileges than whites, but more than Blacks.
Finally, it can said that multiracialism advocates have failed to defend ade-
quately the proposition that the mere multiplication of racial categories will re-
duce race-based discrimination, render racial classifications meaningless, or
increase social harmony and equality.
Indeed, given the normalization of white supremacist discourse agree-
ments, the visually overdetermined racial situation of Blacks in law and society
under the corporeal schema of racial determination, the reification of the look
in racial discourse, the treatment of whiteness as valued property to be pro-
tected at all costs, and the evasion of the sociopolitical meaning of the claim to
whiteness, the pursuit of transcendence may turn out to be chimerical. If
"passing" is no longer a politically viable response to oppression, as Carole-
Anne Tyler asserts,208 then perhaps the pursuit of racial transcendence too has
proved to be an illusion, nothing more than a sentiment that acts as a firewall
against radical antisubordination critique of race. Demystification as a critical
practice will not allow critical theorists to maintain the illusion of racial tran-
scendence, which invests the racial condition of the individual with too much
choice, or to maintain the illusion of racial purity, which affords no choice at
all.
In this Article, I have attempted to show that the assumptions and ideologi-
cal investments that underlie "passing" as it has been traditionally been con-
ceptualized support white supremacy. I have tried to show this by arguing that
in law and popular consciousness appearance operates as the epistemological
guarantee of racial determination, despite all other tests devised to determine
race, including ancestry. Race is determined in the context of first-time en-
counters. "Passing" for white, from this perspective, is no different than simply
being white. And yet, the discourse on "passing" has attributed Blackness to
the "passer" as a means of subordinating Blacks, when in fact there is no racial
identity without "passing."
Key to this demonstration has been the exploration of the split created be-
208. See supra note 30.
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tween law and society by the contradiction of the Black white person circulat-
ing in our midst, and the split between identity and subjectivity in the con-
struction of racialized bodies. In order to reclaim Black subjectivity from white
racial discourse, it was necessary to expose the absurdity of the construct of the
Black person who "passes" for white.
Critical Race Theory has challenged white supremacy but has yet to ar-
ticulate a conception of race that could replace biological race and still remain
faithful to everyday racial experience. In the absence of such a conception,
critical literature on "passing" has generally lapsed into the racial ideology that
equates partial African ancestry with Blackness and has failed to apprehend
"passing" as part of the discourse of white supremacy.
As a consequence, the tautology of white identity, the myth of racial purity,
the fiction of the Black within, and the construction of "passing" as a racial
transgression are perpetuated in current movements for racial transcendence
such as colorblindness and multiracialism. By the terms set, it is a transcen-
dence that will never come.

